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Abstract
E↵ects of Virtual Humans’ Facial Emotional Displays on
Persuasion
Yuqiong Wang
Supervising Professor: Joe Geigel
This dissertation explores the e↵ect of virtual humans’ facial emo-
tional displays in the context of persuasion. In a collaborative problem-
solving game, participants received persuasive information from a vir-
tual teammate. The first study demonstrated that a subservient vir-
tual teammate’s facial emotional displays reduced his or her persua-
sive capacity. The second study revealed that the e↵ect of a virtual
human’s facial emotional displays was jointly determined by whether
the observer was in power, and/or whether the observer considered it
appropriate to express emotions. Emotional expressions undermined
persuasion when the observer overpowered the virtual human, and/or
when the observer perceived emotional expressions to be inappropriate.
When both conditions were satisfied, emotional expressions reduced
persuasion the most. The third study suggested that the amount of
anger expressions predicted the outcome of persuasion. Photorealism,
while on one hand enhanced the perception of anger expressions, did
not moderate the e↵ect of emotional expressions. Findings from this
ix
study inform theories of emotional expressions in persuasion, and guide
the design of persuasive virtual humans.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Emotion plays an important role in our social life. Studies have demon-
strated that when people express emotions, observers extract social in-
formation from these emotional expressions, and use this information to
guide their social decisions. For example, people perceive angry politi-
cians to be more competent, and consequently give them more support
(Tiedens, 2001). Virtual humans are virtual representations of humans
in virtual environments. In this dissertation, we explored the e↵ect of
virtual humans’ facial emotional displays in the context of persuasion.
Two research questions were investigated:
1. Do virtual humans’ facial emotional displays have an e↵ect on
persuasion?
2. What factors moderate the e↵ect of virtual humans’ facial emo-
tional displays in the context of persuasion?
Three studies were conducted to address these questions.
21.1 Emotion as social information
Emotions are subjective experiences (Scherer & Tannenbaum, 1986) ac-
companied by physiological and neurological reactions (Levenson, Ek-
man, & Friesen, 1990), facial expressions (Ekman, 1993), and a sense
of action readiness (Frijda, 1986).
Di↵erent theories of emotions exist. Darwin (1872) proposed that
emotions evolved because they had adaptive value. For example, fear
evolved because it helped people to act in ways that enhanced their
chances of survival. Later, James (1884) proposed that people ex-
perience emotion because they perceive their bodies’ physiological re-
sponses to external events. According to the James-Lange theory, peo-
ple do not cry because they feel sad; rather, people feel sad because
they cry. Schachter and Singer (1962) added that two factors jointly
define emotion: physiological arousal and the cognitive interpretation
of that arousal. The Schachter-Singer theory, or the Two Factor Theory
of Emotion, proposes that emotion begins as a somewhat undi↵erenti-
ated bodily sensation, and the meaning of this sensation is constructed
by higher cognition. In contrast, the Cannon-Bard theory (Cannon,
1927) states that the experience of emotion happens at the same time
that physiological arousal happens; neither one causes the other. Fi-
nally, Appraisal theories of emotion (e.g. Lazarus, 1991) suggest that
emotions result from people’s interpretations and explanations of their
3circumstances even in the absence of physiological arousal.
Despite debates on theories of emotions and disagreement on whether
there is a correspondence between emotions and expressions (Fridlund,
Ekman, & Oster, 1987; Russell, Bachorowski, & Ferna´ndez-Dols, 2003),
most theorists agree that human emotion involves expressive behaviors
such as facial expressions (Ekman, 1993).
Why do we express emotions?
From an evolutionary standpoint, emotional expressions aid survival.
For instance, when we encounter an angry and defensive stranger, it
would indicate that the person may be aggressive, leading to us back
o↵ and avoid possible danger. Klinnert (1984); Klinnert, Emde, But-
terfield, and Campos (1986) demonstrated that infants as young as 12
months old seek out emotional information and use it to evaluate un-
familiar toys. When the mother poses fear, infants move closer to the
mother compared to when she expresses joy or no expression.
Fridlund (1994); Clark, Pataki, and Carver (1996) further hypothe-
sized that each emotion conveys specifiable and widely known social in-
formation, and people intentionally and strategically express emotions
to others to accomplish social goals, including presenting themselves to
others in a positive light, ingratiating themselves to others, intimidat-
ing others, and getting help from others. For example, anger is used to
intimidate and get others to do certain things (Averill, 1983; Clark et
al., 1996).
4Presumably, people who e↵ectively express emotions have a higher
chance of survival. For example, children who convey distress more ef-
fectively to their caregivers are more likely to be nurtured. Individuals
who display anger appropriately are more likely to scare o↵ dangerous
enemies, just as attackers who are better attuned to signs of anger in
their enemies are more likely to avoid deadly combat (Fridlund, 1994).
People who use anger expressions to intimidate and change others’ be-
havior are more likely to obtain more resources and achieve higher
status (Averill, 1983; Clark et al., 1996). Finally, people who express
happiness in the right circumstances probably develop better social net-
works, receive more social support in times of su↵ering, and lead more
successful social lives (Lopes, Salovey, Coˆte´, Beers, & Petty, 2005). In
summary, appropriate expressions of emotion serve to aid survival and
reproduction (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010).
On the one hand, people encode information into their emotional
expressions, while on the other hand, people decode others’ emotional
expressions to extract information (Clark et al., 1996). More recently,
the Emotion As Social Information (EASI) model (Van Kleef, 2009;
Van Kleef et al., 2010) proposes that individuals extract social informa-
tion from others’ emotional expressions to disambiguate the situation
and to inform their social decisions. Table 1.1 lists some emotional
expressions and the social information they encode, summarized by
Van Kleef et al. (2010).
5Table 1.1: Emotional expressions and their social signals
Emotion Social signal
Happiness, joy, contentment Opportunity, a liation
Anger, frustration, irritation Dominance, aggression
Sadness, distress, disappointment, worry Supplication
Guilt, regret, embarrassment Appeasement
The EASI model further suggests that the meaning and social con-
sequences of emotional expressions depend on the cooperative versus
competitive nature of the situation. The same emotion, when expressed
in a cooperative setting versus in a competitive situation, may have
distinctive consequences (Lanzetta & Englis, 1989). Therefore, when
studying the interpersonal e↵ects of emotional expressions, it is impor-
tant to take into consideration the social context.
While some social contexts have received much attention, for exam-
ple negotiation (e.g. Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006;
Van Kleef & Coˆte´, 2007), others are under-explored, such as persuasion
(Van Kleef, van den Berg, & Heerdink, 2014).
1.2 Emotional expression and persuasion
Attitude change and persuasion is an important and active research
topic. Allport (1935) argued the concept of attitude is probably the
most distinctive and indispensable concept in American social psychol-
ogy. Later, Kelman (1974) rea rmed that attitudes have become even
more central in social psychology. And Petty, Wegener, and Fabrigar
6(1997) acknowledged the sheer amount of research work on attitudes
and their many interesting applications in the areas of counseling and
consumer psychology.
Attitudes have been defined in a variety of ways. Following Petty
(2013), attitudes are summary evaluations of objects (e.g. oneself, other
people, issues, etc) along a dimension raging from positive to negative.
In short, an attitude is a positive or negative orientation toward a
target.
Persuasion is an attempt to change people’s attitudes (Cialdini &
Garde, 1987). For example, advertisers try to persuade potential cus-
tomers to buy a product. To do this, they try to create a positive
attitude toward the product.
Researchers have observed that emotions play an important role in
persuasion. There exists a large body of literature on the intrapersonal
e↵ects of emotion (i.e., how one’s own emotions a↵ect the way he or she
is persuaded, e.g. Petty, Fabrigar, & Wegener, 2003). Studies have also
examined the impact of emotional framing (e.g., the e↵ect of framing
a persuasive message to match receivers’ emotion; see DeSteno, Petty,
Rucker, Wegener, & Braverman, 2004).
In contrast, far fewer studies have investigated the interpersonal
e↵ects of emotions in persuasion (i.e., how a source’s emotional ex-
pressions a↵ect how recipients are persuaded.) To fill in this blank,
Van Kleef et al. (2014) recently conducted a series of studies to explore
7how others’ emotions a↵ect one’s attitude formation and change. The
authors reported that when expressed toward an attitude object, emo-
tional expressions facilitated the development of attitudes that are con-
gruent with the evaluative information inherit in the emotional expres-
sions. For example, when an athlete representative expressed sadness
regarding plans to remove bobsleighing from the Olympics, observers
developed more positive attitudes about bobsleighing (compared to
when the athlete representative expressed happiness). On the other
hand, when directed at recipients’ attitude, emotional expressions such
as anger exerted greater attitude change in the direction of the source’s
position than expressions of happiness. In another experiment, a part-
ner expressed anger with a comment saying the recipient’s opinion is
“ridiculous”, and this partner was found to be more e↵ective in chang-
ing attitudes than a partner that expressed happiness while saying “I
only see advantages”. The authors concluded that people use the eval-
uative information inherent in others’ emotional expressions to inform
their own attitudes, but only when they are motivated and able to
process this information.
As Van Kleef et al. (2014) pointed out, the interpersonal e↵ects of
emotional expressions on persuasion is under-explored, and there is a
need for more investigation on this topic. This dissertation seeks to
provide insight on this topic.
81.3 Virtual humans’ emotional expression and per-
suasion
While e↵ects of real humans’ emotional expressions have been stud-
ied, in this dissertation we are interested in e↵ects of virtual humans’
emotional expressions. Virtual humans are virtual representations of
humans in virtual environments. Some examples of virtual humans
include SecondLife avatars (Fig. 1.1) and intelligent museum guides
(Fig. 1.2).
Recent advancement in computational technologies has made possi-
ble interactions between humans and virtual humans in fields such as
sales, counseling, education, gaming, etc. For example, virtual humans
help us at online shopping websites and banking websites. They assist
us at technology conferences (Yacci & Marcello, 2010) and in educa-
tional programs (Lester & Stone, 1997). They o↵er therapies to those
who su↵er from PTSD (Rizzo et al., 2005; Kenny, Parsons, Gratch,
& Rizzo, 2008). And they play poker with us (Koda & Maes, 1996).
As virtual humans engage in more social tasks, some interesting ques-
tions emerge, such as: Are virtual humans more e↵ective in performing
certain tasks? Will virtual humans replace real humans in certain sit-
uations?
In the context of persuasion, researchers have asked: What are
9Figure 1.1: Second Life avatars
10
Figure 1.2: Museum guides Ada and Grace
the benefits (and costs) of presenting persuasive information via vir-
tual humans (Berry, Butler, & De Rosis, 2005)? While studies have
shown that virtual humans are capable of persuasion (Guadagno, Blas-
covich, Bailenson, & Mccall, 2007; Ochs & Prendinger, 2010; Wang,
Khooshabeh, & Gratch, 2013), scholars are still uncertain whether and
how virtual human can utilize emotions to aid persuasion. Existing
findings have been mixed: while some studies showed that virtual hu-
mans’ emotional expressions may have a negative impact on persuasion
(Berry et al., 2005), others demonstrated that it is possible for virtual
humans to strategically display emotions to facilitate persuasion (Ochs
& Prendinger, 2010).
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More importantly, scientists are still in search of theories underly-
ing the occurrence of social influence within virtual environments, and
questions such as what is the e↵ect of virtual humans’ emotional ex-
pressions remain unanswered. In this dissertation, we explore the e↵ect
of virtual humans’ emotional expressions in the context of perusaion.
Our results will help address questions such as whether and how virtual
humans can utilize emotional expressions to aid persuasion, and what
are the benefits and costs of presenting persuasive information via vir-
tual humans. Findings would also inform theories of social influence
within virtual environments.
1.4 Facial expressions as a means to express emo-
tions
Emotions can be expressed via various channels. For example, emotions
can be expressed via facial expressions, body gestures, vocal language,
and so on.
Tomkins (1962, 1963) suggested that emotion is the basis of human
motivation and that the seat of emotion is in the face. Tomkins con-
ducted a first study demonstrating that facial expressions are reliably
associated with certain emotional states (Tomkins & Mc Carter, 1964).
Later, Tomkins, Paul Ekman, and Carroll Izard discovered high cross-
cultural agreement in judgments of emotions in faces by people in both
literate (Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969; Ekman & Friesen, 1971;
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Figure 1.3: The six basic emotions
Izard, 1971; Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972; Ekman, 1973) and
preliterate cultures (Ekman et al., 1969; Ekman & Friesen, 1971). Six
facial expressions of emotion (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness,
and surprise, see Fig. 1.3) were proposed to be universal across culture,
gender, and race (Ekman, 1973).
As the concept of the six universal facial expressions became per-
vasive, scholars also looked at virtual faces as well as their ability to
express emotions.
Neuroscientists have suggested that real and synthetic faces appear
to be processed by the brain in a similar manner: di↵erent face stimuli
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- ranging from photographs, paintings, sketches, to simple line draw-
ings - equally triggered the N170, which is a component of the Event-
Related Potential that reflects the neural processing of faces (Sagiv &
Bentin, 2001). And when virtual faces express emotions, they elicit
amygdala activation similarly to emotional expressions by real human
faces (Moser et al., 2007).
Not only do virtual faces produce similar brain activity as real faces,
they also elicit social e↵ects that are similar to those elicited by real
faces. de Melo, Carnevale, and Gratch (2011a) took findings based on
real humans’ emotional expressions - e.g. people concede more to an
angry negotiator than a happy one (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead,
2004a, 2004b; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006) - and tried to replicate them
using virtual humans’ emotional expressions. Results indicated that
e↵ects observed in past studies with human emotional expressions also
occurred in human-virtual human interactions; emotions expressed by
virtual faces elicited the same e↵ects as those expressed by real humans.
Nevertheless, a followup study (de Melo, Carnevale, & Gratch, 2013)
suggested that e↵ects elicited by virtual humans’ emotional expressions
can be weaker than those elicited by real humans.
In this study, we reviewed literature on the interpersonal e↵ects of
emotional expressions based on both real humans’ emotional expres-
sions and virtual humans’ emotional expression. We focused on e↵ects
of virtual humans’ emotional expressions in the context of persuasion.
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In all our experiments, emotions were expressed via virtual humans’
facial expressions, and virtual humans were rendered as screen-based,
face-only representations.
1.5 Research Questions
We addressed two research questions in this dissertation, as described
below.
1.5.1 Do virtual humans’ facial displays of emotion have an
e↵ect on persuasion?
Studies have shown that virtual humans are capable of persuasion
(Guadagno et al., 2007; Ochs & Prendinger, 2010; Wang et al., 2013),
but there exists disagreement on whether virtual humans can utilize
their emotional expressions to facilitate persuasion.
An experiment conducted by Berry et al. (2005) demonstrated that
presenting information via an emotional virtual human had little ben-
efit. On the other hand, Koster (2006); Ochs and Prendinger (2010)
showed that virtual humans can strategically display emotions to facil-
itate persuasion. More specifically, Koster (2006) demonstrated that
an empathetic virtual human can be more persuasive than a non-
empathetic one. Ochs and Prendinger (2010) suggested that a virtual
human can increase his or her persuasiveness by adapting his or her
emotions based on the interactant’s emotional responses.
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To answer the question of whether virtual humans can use emotional
expressions to aid persuasion, we investigated a first research question:
Research Question 1: Do virtual humans’ facial displays of emotion
have an e↵ect on persuasion?
Study 1 was conducted to address Research Question 1. A brief
introduction of Study 1 can be found in section 1.6.2 (page 23), and
details can be found in Chapter 3 (page 74).
1.5.2 What factors moderate the e↵ect of virtual humans’
facial emotional displays in persuasion?
While Research Question 1 is concerned with the e↵ect of emotional ex-
pressions, Research Question 2 investigates whether this e↵ect is jointly
determined by multiple factors.
As suggested by social scientists, the e↵ect of real humans’ emotional
expressions may depend on additional factors. In the context of per-
suasion, Van Kleef et al. (2014) have shown that the e↵ect of emotional
expressions is moderated by participants’ epistemic motivation (i.e.,
motivation to search for and process new information; see Kruglanski,
1989; De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003). Studies on negotiation have intro-
duced power and perceived appropriateness as two moderators on the
e↵ect of anger expressions (Van Kleef et al., 2004b; Van Kleef & Coˆte´,
2007).
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Inspired by these studies based on real humans’ emotional expres-
sions, we speculated that the e↵ect of virtual humans’ emotional ex-
pressions is also moderated by additional factors. We are interested
not only in social factors such as power and perceived appropriateness,
but also in variables that are unique to virtual humans, such as pho-
torealism. We examined whether these factors moderate the e↵ect of
virtual humans’ emotional expressions, in an attempt to address Re-
search Question 2:
Research Question 2: What factors moderate the e↵ect of virtual
humans’ facial emotional displays in persuasion?
Study 2 and Study 3 were conducted to address Research Question 2.
Section 1.6.3 (page 24) gives a brief overview of Study 2 , and Chapter 4
(page 94) introduces the study in detail. A brief introduction of Study
3 can be found in section 1.6.4 (page 25), and detailed descriptions are
in Chapter 5 (page 113).
1.6 Overview of Studies
1.6.1 Disambiguation
Emotion, mood, and a↵ect
In this dissertation we focus on emotion as opposed to mood or a↵ect.
The terms emotion, mood, and a↵ect are sometimes used loosely
or interchangeably but carry distinct meanings in emotion research,
therefore we distinguish among them here. Following Parrott (2001),
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we adopt the widely accepted view that emotion and mood are di↵eren-
tiated by the degree to which a↵ective states are more or less directed
toward specific situational stimuli (which can include people, things,
events, etc). As Parrott (2001) put it, “Emotions are about, or di-
rected toward, something in the world... In contrast, moods lack this
quality of object directedness; a person in an irritable mood is not nec-
essarily angry about anything in particular - he or she is just generally
grumpy” (p. 3).
Emotions may also be said to be more di↵erentiated and of shorter
duration, whereas moods are more enduring and pervasive, if generally
of lower intensity (Barry, 1999; Forgas, 1992).
In short, emotion in this dissertation implies intense feelings that
arise from interacting with the other party during the social interac-
tion. In all the experiments, virtual humans expressed strong, short-
lived emotions such as happiness and anger in response to participants’
answers.
Emotional expressions toward an object, an attitude, and a person
Emotions can be expressed toward an object, an attitude, or a person.
For example, in the experiments conducted by Klinnert (1984); Klin-
nert et al. (1986), the mother expressed emotions toward an object (i.e.,
a toy).
Alternatively, emotions can be expressed toward an attitude. For
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example, in the persuasion studies conducted by Van Kleef et al. (2014),
a representative expressed sadness concerning abandoning bobsleighing
from the Olympics (Study 1), and a partner expressed anger toward
participants’ opinion (“It’s ridiculous”, see Study 5). In the negotiation
studies conducted by Van Kleef et al. (2004b); Van Kleef and Coˆte´
(2007), the negotiator was angry toward participants’ o↵er (“This o↵er
makes me really angry”).
Finally, emotions can also be directed at a person. Brave, Nass, and
Hutchinson (2005) implemented a virtual human who expressed empa-
thetic emotions toward the participants (e.g. “I am glad you won”).
Arguably, emotional expressions targeted at an object, an attitude,
and a person can carry di↵erent social signals, and may have di↵erent
social consequences. For example, a negotiator who expresses anger
toward his opponent’s o↵er (“This o↵er makes me really angry”) may
be seen as di↵erent from one that expresses anger toward his opponent
(“You make me really angry”). In the former case, the opponent may
perceive the negotiator to be tough and subsequently concede. How-
ever, in the latter case, the opponent may develop negative a↵ects and
retaliate.
We propose that it is important to distinguish between emotional
expressions toward an object, an attitude, and a person. Studies on
the e↵ects of emotional expressions should take into consideration the
target of emotional expressions.
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In this study, emotional expressions were targeted at the recipients
(e.g. “You should rank it 1!”).
The control group in studies on the interpersonal e↵ects of emotional ex-
pressions
Researchers have used di↵erent control groups when studying the in-
terpersonal e↵ects of emotional expressions. For example, Van Kleef
et al. (2006, 2014) compared one emotion with another (happiness vs.
anger). Koster (2006) contrasted the presence of emotions with the ab-
sence of emotions (empathetic emotions vs. no emotion). Others have
compared one strategy with another, e.g. cooperative emotional expres-
sions vs. individualistic emotional expressions (de Melo, Carnevale, &
Gratch, 2011b), and adaptive emotional expressions vs. non-adaptive
emotional expressions (Ochs & Prendinger, 2010).
It is important to take into consideration the control group while
studying the e↵ects of emotional expressions. For example, anger ex-
pressions are more e↵ective in changing attitudes than happiness ex-
pressions (Van Kleef et al., 2014) does not mean that anger expressions
are more e↵ective than no emotions.
In this study, we contrasted a virtual human that expressed happi-
ness and anger following the Carrot-and-Stick strategy1 with one that
1The Carrot and Stick approach originated from a cart driver dangling a carrot in front of a mule
and holding a stick behind it. The mule would move towards the carrot because it wants the reward
of food, while also moving away from the stick behind it, since it does not want the punishment of
pain, thus drawing the cart.
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did not express any emotions. The Carrot and Stick approach is a
strategy to influence others via the use of reward and punishment. This
strategy is commonly used in our everyday life. For example, parents
give kids a candy as a reward for behaving, and a spank as a punish-
ment for misbehaving. People also use emotional expressions to signal
reward and punishment. For example, bosses smile at employees when
the employees have done a good job, and frown at them when they did
not perform well. In the present study, the virtual human expressed
happiness when the participants’ answers were close to the expert an-
swer, and expressed anger when their answers were far way from the
expert answer.
Subjective measure vs. behavioral measure
Studies have measured persuasion using both subjective measures and
behavioral measures.
A typical subjective measure is to access users’ attitude towards the
system or the task using a self-report questionnaire. For example, par-
ticipants are provided a questionnaire that contains questions about
certain characteristics of the system. These responses are usually mea-
sured as ratings on a 5- or 7-point scale ranging from “characteristic
is fully present” to “characteristic is fully absent”. The dimensions
addressed in these questionnaires commonly pertain to the perceived
intelligence, likeability and activity of the system or virtual human, to
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how entertaining and useful the system is, and to the degree of com-
fortability during interaction. In a recent study on attitude change
(Van Kleef et al., 2014), the dependent measure was calculated based
on participants’ ratings on adjectives (e.g. positive, negative, favorable,
bad, etc) describing their opinion on attitude objects such as abandon-
ing bobsleighing as an Olympic sport.
On the other hand, behavioral measures are concerned with data
reflecting the e↵ectiveness of the human-virtual human interaction with
regard to the goal of the interaction process. For instance, for a system
designed to persuade, the focus is to investigate whether the virtual
human is capable of persuasion.
Few studies have employed behavioral measures when studying per-
suasion. We propose that it is important to use behavioral measures
while studying persuasion. First, attitudes are presumed to a↵ect be-
havior. For example, advertisers try to make people feel more positive
toward a product because they expect positive attitudes will lead to
buying behavior. If attitudes do not a↵ect buying behavior, advertis-
ers would not have cared as much about attitudes. Furthermore, a
study comparing self-report measures and behavioral measures in the
context of virtual environments (Bailenson et al., 2004) suggested that
nonverbal behavior may be a more sensitive measure of the copresence
and general influence of embodied agents than self-report measures,
and there are clearly strong advantages of using behavioral measures.
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Given these reasons, in this study we employed a behavioral measure.
Participants were asked to solve a problem on a computer interface,
and a virtual human attempted to make the participants to change
their solutions. We measured persuasion by calculating the amount of
changes participants had made after receiving persuasive information
from the virtual human.
Agents vs. avatars
We define virtual humans as screen-based virtual representations of
humans in virtual environments (Fig. 1.1, Fig. 1.2), whether driven
by real humans (avatars) or controlled by computational algorithms
(agents).
Literature has suggested that there exist di↵erences in the occur-
rence of social influence between avatars and agents (Blascovich, 2002a,
2002b), and emotional expressions from avatars may elicit stronger ef-
fects than those from agents (de Melo, Gratch, & Carnevale, 2015).
We call for future studies to separately study the e↵ects of emotional
expressions by avatars versus agents in the context of persuasion.
In our experiments, participants were aware that they were interact-
ing with a virtual human. However, they were not told whether it was
an avatar or an agent.
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1.6.2 Study 1
Study 1 attempts to address Research Question 1: Do virtual humans’
facial displays of emotion have an e↵ect on persuasion?
In Study 1, participants were asked to solve the Lunar Survival Task
(see section 2.3 on page 69 for detailed introduction) on a computer in-
terface. Participants needed to rank fifteen items (e.g. oxygen, food
concentrate, etc.) based on each item’s importance in aiding survival.
They first ranked the items independently; then they were encouraged
to discuss rankings with a virtual teammate. During the discussion, the
virtual human asked the participants to change their rankings. Partic-
ipants under the emotional condition interacted with an emotional vir-
tual human. The emotional virtual human expressed happiness and
anger following the Carrot-and-Stick strategy. More specifically, a
happy facial expression was shown when the participants ranked an
item close to NASA’s expert ranking, and an angry facial expression
was displayed if the participants’ answer was far away from NASA’s
expert ranking. Participants under the non-emotional condition com-
municated with a virtual human that did not display any emotions.
Persuasion was measured by calculating the amount of changes the
participants had made after interacting with the virtual human. To
give participants full decision power, all participants played the role
of a leader. We hypothesized that a virtual humans’ facial displays of
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emotion including happiness and anger would help persuasion.
This study is described in detail in Chapter 3 (page 74).
1.6.3 Study 2
Study 2 aims to address Research Question 2: What factors moderate
the e↵ect of virtual humans’ facial emotional displays in persuasion?
Social science studies have demonstrated that the e↵ects of humans’
emotional expressions are jointly determined by additional factors. In
the context of persuasion, Van Kleef et al. (2014) showed that the ef-
fect of emotional expressions is moderated by participants’ epistemic
motivation (i.e., motivation to search for and process new information;
see Kruglanski, 1989; De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003). Studies on nego-
tiation have introduced power and perceived appropriateness as two
moderators on the e↵ect of anger expressions (Van Kleef et al., 2004b;
Van Kleef & Coˆte´, 2007).
Inspired by these findings in human-human interaction, Study 2 in-
vestigated whether the e↵ect of a virtual human’s facial emotional dis-
plays is also determined by multiple factors. Two potential moderators
were examined in Study 2, namely power and perceived appropriate-
ness. Using the same persuasion task as Study 1, Study 2 employed a 2
(Virtual human’s facial emotional display: Emotional, Non-emotional)
by 2 (Participant’s power: Powerful, Powerless) by 2 (Perceived appro-
priateness: Inappropriate, Appropriate) between-subject design. We
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hypothesized that the e↵ect of a virtual human’s facial emotional dis-
plays is jointly determined by power and perceived appropriateness,
as seen in negotiation studies (Van Kleef & Coˆte´, 2007). Chapter 4
(page 94) introduces Study 2 in detail.
1.6.4 Study 3
Study 3 continues to explore Research Question 2: What factors mod-
erate the e↵ect of a virtual human’s facial emotional displays in per-
suasion?
How a virtual human is rendered may impact the delivery of emo-
tional information and its social consequences. For example, a photo-
realistic angry virtual human may be perceived as more angry than a
non-photorealistic angry virtual human, and consequently elicit more
responses. Study 3 examined whether photorealism has an e↵ect on
the perception of emotions and the virtual human’s persuasiveness.
Previous studies (e.g. Yee, Bailenson, & Rickertsen, 2007) have
demonstrated that virtual humans with higher photorealism can pro-
duce more positive social interactions than those with lower photoreal-
ism. However, virtual humans in these studies did not express emotions.
What happens when virtual humans express emotions? Does pho-
torealism still matter? Study 3 attempted to address this question by
comparing the persuasive capacity of a photorealistic emotional vir-
tual human with a non-photorealistic emotional virtual human. The
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photorealistic emotional virtual human was hypothesized to be more
persuasive than the non-photorealistic one. Details of this study can
be found in Chapter 5 (page 113).
1.7 Significance
Attitudes are said to be the most distinctive and indispensable concept
in contemporary American social psychology (Allport, 1935; Kelman,
1974; Petty et al., 1997), and tremendous attention has been focused
on the study of attitude change and persuasion (e.g. Petty et al., 1997,
2003; DeSteno et al., 2004; Petty, 2013; Van Kleef et al., 2014; Petty
& Brin˜ol, 2015).
However, social scientists have pointed out that there is a lack of fo-
cus on the interpersonal e↵ects of emotional expressions in persuasion
(Van Kleef et al., 2014). Meanwhile, computer scientists are also faced
with a scarcity of studies on the e↵ect of virtual humans’ emotional
expressions in persuasion. Among existing studies, findings have been
contradictory: On one hand, Berry et al. (2005) demonstrated that
presenting information via an emotional virtual human did not help
persuasion. On the other hand, Koster (2006); Ochs and Prendinger
(2010) showed that it is possible for virtual humans to strategically dis-
play emotions to facilitate persuasion. According to Beale and Creed
(2009), results regarding virtual humans’ emotional expressions are of-
ten inconclusive and contradictory, and it is essential that more research
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studies focus on this area.
We believe by exploring e↵ects of virtual humans’ emotional expres-
sions, we contribute to the literature by promoting a better under-
standing on how virtual human’s emotional expressions a↵ect behavior
in persuasion. In turn, the community can be better equipped to in-
vestigate questions such as what are the benefits (and risks) of using
emotional virtual humans in persuasion, how to design and develop
persuasive virtual humans, and how can virtual humans strategically
use emotions to aid persuasion. Some of these questions have immedi-
ate applications in domains such as marketing, education, counseling,
gaming, and so on.
On the other hand, as many findings from human-human interaction
can be replicated in human-computer interaction (e.g. Nass, Moon, &
Green, 1997; Fogg & Nass, 1997; Nass, Moon, & Carney, 1999; de Melo
et al., 2011a), our findings may inform theories in social science as well.
Thus, we respond to requests made by social scientists (Van Kleef et
al., 2014) regarding carrying out more investigation on the interpersonal
e↵ects of emotional expressions in persuasion.
In addition, few studies have addressed e↵ects of emotional expres-
sions targeted at a person. Previous studies (e.g. Van Kleef et al.,
2014) have mainly focused on emotional expressions targeted at an at-
titude (e.g. expression of sadness concerning abandoning bobsleighing
from the Olympics). We propose that emotional expressions targeted
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at an object, an attitude, and a person may carry di↵erent meanings,
and can lead to di↵erent social consequences. Findings from this study
may speak to the importance of separately study emotional expressions
targeted at an attitude vs. at a person.
Furthermore, Bailenson et al. (2004) has pointed out that nonverbal
behavior may be a more sensitive measure of the copresence and gen-
eral influence of embodied agents than self-report measures, and there
are clearly strong advantages of using behavioral measures. However,
existing studies on attitude change and persuasion have mainly relied
on subjective measures such as ratings of virtual humans’ persuasive-
ness (Berry et al., 2005; Ochs & Prendinger, 2010). The present study
employed a behavioral measure. This study will add to the limited
body of literature that focuses on behavior in persuasive, as opposed
to perceived persuasiveness or self-report attitudes. Findings from this
study would be valuable to applications that aim at changing behavior.
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows: We con-
duct a literature review in Chapter 2 (page 30). Chapter 3 (page 74)
presents Study 1, which investigates the e↵ect of a virtual human’s
emotional displays in persuasion. Study 2 is described in Chapter 4
(page 94), where potential moderators including power and perceived
appropriates are explored. Chapter 5 (page 113) introduces Study 3
which examines whether photorealism a↵ects the perception of emo-
tions and virtual humans’ persuasive capacity. Finally some conclusions
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are made in Chapter 6 (page 128).
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Chapter 2
Background
Emotion plays an important role in our social life. Studies have shown
that emotional expressions from those around us a↵ect our behavior.
Since an infant, we read emotions from people we trust and use them to
guide our decisions when facing uncertainties (Klinnert, 1984; Klinnert
et al., 1986).
In this chapter, we review literature on the interpersonal e↵ects of
emotional expressions. Empirical studies are grouped by context, as the
meaning and social consequents of emotional expressions are dependent
on the social context where the emotions are being expressed (Van Kleef
et al., 2010).
We first review literature in human-human interactions in section 2.1
(page 31), followed by a review on human-virtual human interactions
in section 2.2 (page 47). Then we briefly introduce the Lunar Survival
Task (section 2.3, page 69) and Amazon Mechanical Turk (section 2.4,
page 71).
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2.1 The interpersonal e↵ects of emotional expres-
sions in human-human interactions
2.1.1 Empirical studies
Persuasion
Persuasion is the attempt to change people’s attitudes. In the field of
attitude change and persuasion, much attention has been given to the
intrapersonal e↵ects of emotion on persuasion (i.e., how one’s emotional
state a↵ects how he or she is persuaded, e.g. Petty et al., 2003). There
is also a lot of e↵ort on emotional framing (e.g., consequences when
one receives a persuasive message that is framed to match his or her
emotional state, e.g. DeSteno et al., 2004). In contrast, very limited
persuasion studies have looked at the interpersonal e↵ects of emotional
expressions (i.e., how others’ emotional state a↵ect persuasion of the
observer; Van Kleef et al., 2014).
Recently, Van Kleef et al. (2014) conducted five experiments on at-
titude formation and change. In the first experiment, participants read
a newspaper article about dropping bobsleighing from the Olympics,
which included text information suggesting that a representative of the
Olympic committee “responded with joy/sadness when he heard about
the commotion”, and that he “is happy/sad that bobsleighing may lose
its status as an Olympic sport”. Results indicated that participants
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developed more positive attitudes about bobsleighing when the repre-
sentative was sad than when he was happy. Attitude was measured by
participants providing subjective ratings on five descriptors on visual
analogies scales.
This e↵ect was replicated in a second experiment. The authors also
added a control condition where the source expressed no emotion (in
the first experiment, the authors contrasted happiness with sadness).
Results confirmed that participants developed attitudes that were con-
gruent with the evaluative information that was inherent in the source’s
emotional expressions. Participants reported more positives attitudes
when the source expressed sadness (over a negatively framed object,
e.g. new shows may replace the current one) than happiness. Happy
and neutral conditions did not di↵er from one another.
The third experiment compared attitude formation on a positively
framed message when participants were under di↵erent cognitive load.
One group of participants were instructed to memorize a ten-digit
phone number and keep rehearsing it throughout the experiment, whereas
the other group was not instructed to do so. Results indicated that
participants use the source’s emotional expressions to inform their own
attitudes only when they have su cient cognitive resources available.
While the first three experiments examined attitude formation, the
fourth and fifth experiments investigated changes in pre-existing atti-
tudes. The fourth experiment demonstrated that emotional expressions
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can not only impact attitude formation, but also change pre-existing
attitudes in the direction that is congruent with the evaluative infor-
mation inherent in the source’s emotional expressions.
The last experiment looked at e↵ects when a source expressed emo-
tions regarding the recipient’s attitude (instead of an attitude object
such as abandoning bobsleighing from the Olympics). Participants
(university students) were first asked their opinion on a number of
student-related issues. Then the participants learned that they were
to participate in a discussion with another participant (which was sim-
ulated by a computer). The simulated partner was programmed to
express an opinion that’s di↵erent from the participant’s. The argu-
ment was followed by consistent emotional statement such as “I see
only advantages” with a smiley, or “It is ridiculous” with an angry
emoticon. The authors observed that expressions of anger that were
directed at the recipient’s attitude exerted greater attitude change in
the direction of the source’s position than expressions of happiness,
but only to the degree that the recipient was motivated to engage in
thorough information processing.
E↵ects occurred in these experiments regardless of whether emotions
were expressed via written words, pictures of facial expressions, film
clips, or emoticons.
In this study, we expanded Van Kleef and colleagues’ study in several
aspects.
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First, we examined e↵ects when emotions are expressed by a virtual
human (as opposed to a real human).
Second, while Van Kleef et al. (2014) showed that epistemic mo-
tivation (i.e., motivation to search for and process new information;
Kruglanski, 1989; De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003) was a moderator on
the interpersonal e↵ect of emotional expressions in persuasion, we fur-
ther examined power and perceived appropriateness as two potential
moderators.
Third, Van Kleef et al. (2014) measured persuasion using self-report
questionnaires. The present study employed a behavioral measure.
Fourth, Van Kleef et al. (2014) mainly focused on contrasting e↵ects
between two emotions (e.g. happiness vs. anger). In this study we
contrasted an emotional virtual human that expressed both happiness
and anger with one that expressed no emotions.
Fifth, Van Kleef et al. (2014) mainly focused on emotional expres-
sions targeted at an attitude object (e.g. expression of sadness con-
cerning abandoning bobsleighing from the Olympics) or at recipients’
attitude (expression of anger toward participants’ opinion regarding the
percentage of journal articles vs. books in a curriculum). The present
study looked at emotional expressions directed personally at the recip-
ients.
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Negotiation
E↵ects of emotional expressions have been intensively studied in the
field of negotiation. Researchers have documented the social meaning
and consequences of certain emotions (Butt, Choi, & Jaeger, 2005); see
Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Meanings and social e↵ects of emotions in negotiation
(Butt et al., 2005)
Emotion Scale items
Relational
meaning
Implications
for reciprocal
action
Concern for
self or
counterpart
Pride
-achievement
Proud
Confident
Feeling competent
Self-admiration
Pleased
Satisfied
Enhancing
one’s
ego-identity
by taking
credit for an
achievement
Expansiveness
and urge to
point to
success
publicly,
increased
self-confidence
High concern
for self-
image, low or
medium
concern for
the counterpart
Gratitude
Thankful
Grateful
Obliged
Appreciative
Liking
Happy
Intimacy in
the absence
of passion
Making
reasonable
progress
towards a
goal
Reach out and
want to help,
repay in kind
Share positive
outcomes with
others
Low concern
for self,
high
concern for the
counterpart
Guilt-Shame
Guilty
Regretful
Ashamed
Embarrassed
Angry with self
Failure to
live up to
an ego ideal
Sense of
inadequacy
Seek social
support
Want to hide,
avoid
the situation
Low to medium
concern for self
and the
counterpart
Anger with
other
Angry
Upset
Furious
Frustrated
Outraged
Hostile
Demeaning
o↵ence
against
me and
mine
Attack and
take revenge
or repress to
preserve self
and social
relationship
High concern
for self, low
concern for the
counterpart
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The first empirical investigations of the interpersonal e↵ects of emo-
tions in negotiations were conducted by Van Kleef et al. (2004a) and
Sinaceur and Tiedens (2006). In a computer-mediated negotiation task
with a simulated opponent, Van Kleef et al. (2004a) provided partic-
ipants with information about the opponent’s emotional state (angry,
happy or no emotion). The authors observed that participants who ne-
gotiated with an angry opponent made larger concessions than did those
with a non-emotional opponent, whereas participants with a happy op-
ponent made smaller concessions. Sinaceur and Tiedens (2006) found
consistent results in face-to-face dyadic negotiations, i.e., participants
conceded more to angry than to happy counterparts.
Van Kleef and colleagues reasoned that negotiators used their oppo-
nent’s emotions to infer the opponent’s limits, and subsequently used
this information to make an o↵er. When negotiators were confronted
with an angry opponent, they judged the opponent’s limit to be high,
and to avoid impasse, they made relatively large concessions. Con-
versely, negotiators with a happy opponent judged the opponent’s limit
to be low, felt no need to concede to avoid impasse, and accordingly
made smaller concessions.
Van Kleef et al. (2004b) further reported that negotiators with a
low epistemic motivation (i.e., low motivation to search for and process
new information; Kruglanski, 1989; De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003) were
una↵ected by the emotions of their counterparts, whereas those with a
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high epistemic motivation were strongly influenced by their opponent’s
emotions. In summary, negotiators may be more or less likely to search
for and process new information about the negotiation situation and
the opponent depending on their epistemic motivation, which may be
influenced by variables such as dispositional need for cognitive closure,
time pressure, fatigue, environmental noise, and power.
Consistent with this theory, Van Kleef et al. (2006) found that ne-
gotiators with high power were less influenced by their counterpart’s
emotions than were negotiators with low power. In their experiments,
powerless negotiators made larger concessions to an angry opponent
than to a happy one, whereas powerful negotiators were una↵ected by
their opponent’s emotions. In other words, power moderated the inter-
personal e↵ect of emotional expressions in negotiation.
Later, Van Kleef and Coˆte´ (2007) suggested that three factors jointly
determine behavior in negotiation: emotional expressions; power; and
perceived appropriateness of the emotional expressions. More specif-
ically, appropriate anger expressions cause powerless observers to co-
operate; whereas inappropriate anger expressions cause powerless ob-
servers to cooperate, and powerful observers to retaliate.
More recently, Adam, Shirako, and Maddux (2010) added that the
perceived appropriateness of anger expressions may di↵er from culture
to culture. They compared perceptions by European Americans versus
Asian and Asian Americans, and found that anger expressions elicited
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larger concessions from European American negotiators, but smaller
concessions from Asian and Asian American negotiators. The authors
concluded that there exist di↵erent cultural norms regarding express-
ing anger in negotiation. To demonstrate this, the appropriateness of
anger expressions was manipulated. When manipulated to be appropri-
ate, anger expressions elicited more concessions from Asian and Asian
American negotiators (as large as European Americans would); when
manipulated to be inappropriate, anger expressions elicited less con-
cessions from European American negotiators (as small as Asian and
Asian American negotiators would).
These findings in negotiation have inspired us to explore potential
moderators in persuasion. According to the EASI model, emotional ex-
pressions contain social information; moderators such as power and per-
ceived appropriateness regulate e↵ects by changing the meaning and/or
information processing of emotional expressions. In the context of per-
suasion, meanings of emotional expressions and how emotional expres-
sion are processed may be impacted by power and perceived appropri-
ateness as well. Therefore, we conducted Study 2 to examine power
and perceived appropriateness as two potential moderators.
Leadership
Studies have demonstrated that leaders can e↵ectively use emotional
expressions to influence followers. Van Kleef et al. (2010) indicated
39
that expressions of anger may increase motivation and performance
among followers who are high on epistemic motivation (i.e., the desire
to develop a thorough understanding of a situation) and among those
who are low on agreeableness, whereas anger undermines motivation
and performance of followers low on epistemic motivation and high on
agreeableness.
Studies comparing happiness and sadness (Visser, van Knippenberg,
van Kleef, & Wisse, 2013) reported that leaders’ displays of happi-
ness enhance follower creative performance, whereas leaders’ displays
of sadness enhance follower analytical performance. Leaders who show
happiness are also judged to be more e↵ective than those who display
sadness, regardless of task type.
While there exist a handful of studies on the e↵ects of leaders’ emo-
tional expressions on followers, there has been very limited attention
on how followers’ emotional expressions a↵ect leaders. Findings from
Study 1 may shed some light on this topic. In Study 1, participants
played the role of a leader, and we observed e↵ects of a subservient vir-
tual human’s emotional expressions on leader behavior in persuasion.
2.1.2 Theories
Several theories have been proposed to address how emotional expres-
sions regulate social interaction. For example, theories of emotional
contagion state that people “catch” others’ emotions unintentionally
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and automatically, and subsequently they would (mis)use their own
feelings or related memories as input to their decision making, or they
would act to maintain/achieve good mood. More recently, the EASI
model (Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef et al., 2010) argues that people
are a↵ected via dual functions: inferential processes and a↵ective re-
actions (e.g. emotional contagion). Which process takes precedence
in guiding social decisions depends on two critical moderators, which
are the cooperative versus competitive nature of the situation (which
determines the meaning and social consequences of emotional expres-
sions), and epistemic motivation (which determines the processing of
emotional information). Below we review these two theories in detail.
Emotional contagion
Emotional expressions from those around us may engender emotional
contagion (Hatfield & Cacioppo, 1994) - the tendency to unintentionally
and automatically “catch” other people’s emotions through their facial
expressions, vocalizations, postures, or bodily movements (e.g., Hess
& Blairy, 2001; Anderson, Keltner, & John, 2003; Hawk, Van Kleef,
Fischer, & Van der Schalk, 2009; Neumann & Strack, 2000; Wild, Erb,
& Bartels, 2001), or through verbal expressions of emotion (e.g., in
computer-mediated interaction; Friedman et al., 2004; Thompson &
Nadler, 2002; Van Kleef et al., 2004b).
Subsequently, the individual’s judgements and decision making may
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be influenced via di↵erent types of a↵ect infusion.
One example of a↵ect infusion is (mis)attributing the a↵ective state
to the situation at hand, and using one’s feelings as input to social
judgments and decisions (i.e., a↵ect-as-information; Schwarz & Clore,
1983). If an individual catches others’ happiness and thereby experi-
ences positive feelings, they may judge the situation as safe and free
from problems, which allows for generosity and exploration rather than
rigid exploitation (Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008).
Another type of a↵ect infusion is priming related ideas and memo-
ries, thereby facilitating their use when planning and executing behav-
ior (i.e., a↵ect priming, see Bower, 1981; Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp,
1978). In a classic study, Carnevale and Isen (1986) manipulated the
mood of negotiating pairs. Half the pairs were given candies and funny
cartoons prior to the negotiation (to put them into a positive mood);
the other half did not receive these treatments. Being in a happy mood
facilitated cooperative information exchange among negotiators, which
helped them to craft creative solutions that allowed both sides to settle
for something beyond a 50-50 split.
Alternatively, after emotion contagion, an individual’s behavior can
also be impacted through mood maintenance and negative state relief.
The core assumption here is that people strive to promote and maintain
positive mood states and to avoid experiencing negative mood states
(Carlson, Charlin, & Miller, 1988). This basic drive motivates people in
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a negative mood to engage in behaviors associated with positive feel-
ings (e.g., helping others) to relieve their negative feeling state (e.g.,
Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent, 1973; Schaller & Cialdini, 1988). Like-
wise, individuals in a positive mood are motivated to exhibit behaviors
that produce positive feelings and to abstain from activities that entail
the risk of spoiling the good mood (i.e., positive mood maintenance,
Wegener & Petty, 1994). Therefore, when an individual observed hap-
piness from those around him/her, he or she may catch the partner’s
happiness (i.e. emotional contagion) and become motivated to maintain
the positive feeling by acting in a friendly and generous way (i.e. mood
maintenance). Similarly, when others express sadness, one may become
equally somber through emotional contagion and become motivated to
relieve oneself of the negative feelings by acting generously.
More recently, Van Kleef et al. (2010) suggested that emotional con-
tagion may account for behavior when people engage in more automatic
ways of information processing. When the situation is perceived as pre-
dominantly cooperative and/or epistemic motivation is low, emotional
expressions may be processed in a more automatic way involving emo-
tional contagion and subsequent a↵ect infusion or mood management.
On the other hand, when the situation is perceived as predominantly
competitive and/or recipients have high epistemic motivation and a
concomitant tendency to engage in deliberate information processing,
inferential processes (see the EASI model below for more details) may
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take precedence over emotional contagion.
Emotion As Social Information (EASI)
The Emotion As Social Information (EASI) model argues that peo-
ple are a↵ected by others’ emotional expressions via a dual function:
inferential process and a↵ective reaction.
Inferential process refers to extracting information from others’ emo-
tional expressions. People’s emotional expressions provide social infor-
mation. For instance, emotions convey information to observers about
the source’s current feelings, social intentions, and orientation toward
the relationship (Ames & Johar, 2009; Knutson, 1996; Manstead, Fis-
cher, & Jakobs, 1999; Van Kleef et al., 2004a). Strong evidence comes
from studies on infant behavior. Klinnert (1984); Klinnert et al. (1986)
found that infants moved closer to their mom when she smiled than
when she looked fearful. Presumably the mother’s emotional displays
signaled that the environment was safe (happiness) or unsafe (fear),
which informed the infant’s behavior. This process of distilling useful
pieces of information from others’ emotional expressions is refereed to
as the inferential process.
A↵ective reactions refers to more automatic, emotional responses to
emotional expressions. One example of a↵ective reaction is emotional
contagion, as discussed in section 2.1.2 (page 40). Another form of
a↵ective reactions is favorable or unfavorable impressions (Hareli &
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Hess, 2010; Knutson, 1996). More specifically, expressions of positive
emotions may inspire positive impressions, and negative emotions may
elicit negative impressions (Clark & Taraban, 1991). Such impressions
may in turn shape social behavior. For instance, we tend to be more
willing to help those we like, and more likely to deny those we do not
like (Clark et al., 1996).
The EASI model suggests that inferential processes and a↵ective
reactions are distinct but mutually influential, and they may relate
to one another in di↵erent ways (Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef et al.,
2010). In some cases inferences and a↵ective reactions lead to the
same behavior, whereas in other cases, they may motivate opposite
behaviors. Which process takes precedence in guiding social decisions
depends on two critical moderators, which are the cooperative versus
competitive nature of the situation (which determines the meaning and
social consequences of emotional expressions), and epistemic motivation
(which determines the processing of emotional information).
The (perceived) cooperative or competitive nature of the social set-
ting is a first crucial determinant of the mediating processes involved in
the interpersonal e↵ects of emotions in social decision making. When
the parties’ goals are cooperatively linked, they are more likely to come
to feel each other’s emotions and to be influenced by subsequent af-
fect infusion and mood management processes. In contrast, competi-
tive situations are typically characterized by lower levels of trust (e.g.,
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Deutsch, 1986). Therefore, not only is there lower likelihood of emo-
tional contagion and concomitant a↵ect infusion and mood manage-
ment processes, any information that reveals a counterpart’s intentions
takes on heightened strategic importance. Therefore, social decisions
in competitive situations are driven less by a↵ective reactions and more
by the strategic inferences that decision makers draw from their coun-
terpart’s emotional expressions.
The second crucial determinant of the interpersonal e↵ects of emo-
tional expressions in social decision making, and the processes that
drive them, is the individual’s information processing motivation. Ac-
cording to EASI, the more thorough the information processing, the
stronger the predictive power of strategic inferences relative to a↵ec-
tive reactions; the shallower the information processing, the stronger
the relative predictive strength of a↵ective reactions (Van Kleef, 2009).
The depth of information processing depends on the individual’s epis-
temic motivation, i.e., his or her willingness to expend e↵ort to achieve
a rich and accurate understanding of the world, including interdepen-
dent others (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003; De Dreu, Nijstad, & van
Knippenberg, 2008; Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, &
De Grada, 2006). Individuals with higher epistemic motivation have
lower confidence in their knowledge and experience less certainty. To
render judgments and make decisions they tend to engage in rather
deliberate, systematic information search and processing (De Dreu et
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al., 2008; Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Smith & DeCoster, 2000).
In conclusion, the EASI model assumes that social decision making
situations are fuzzy and are characterized by insu cient information
about interdependent others’ goals, desires, and intentions. In such an
uncertain environment, people rely on additional cues to make sense
of the situation. When people see emotional expressions from others,
they use information from these emotional expressions to disambiguate
the situation and to inform their social decisions. Such information
may be picked up and subjected to inferential analysis or, alternatively,
processed in a more automatic way involving emotional contagion and
subsequent a↵ect infusion or mood management. Inferential processes
take precedence over a↵ective processes when the situation is perceived
as predominantly competitive and/or recipients have high epistemic
motivation and a concomitant tendency to engage in deliberate infor-
mation processing. Conversely, a↵ective reactions take precedence over
inferential processes when the situation is perceived as predominantly
cooperative and/or epistemic motivation is low.
2.1.3 Summary
Emotional expressions from those around us a↵ect our social decisions
via interferential processes and/or a↵ective reactions (Van Kleef et al.,
2010). Social scientists have placed much attention on the interpersonal
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e↵ects of emotional expressions in fields such as negotiation and lead-
ership. However, there is a lack of research on this topic in the context
of persuasion (Van Kleef et al., 2014). A recent study by Van Kleef et
al. (2014) revealed that a source’s emotional expressions targeted at an
attitude object or at recipients’ opinion provide social information and
a↵ect recipients’ attitudes. The present study further explored e↵ects
of emotional expressions in the context of persuasion and examined
power and perceived appropriateness as two potential moderators.
2.2 E↵ects of emotional expressions in human-virtual
human interactions
In the field of human-virtual human interaction, Beale and Creed (2009)
suggested that although virtual humans’ emotional expressions have
the potential to influence user attitudes and behavior, results regarding
virtual humans’ emotional expressions are often inconclusive and con-
tradictory. For example, some studies observed that virtual humans’
emotional expressions enhanced interaction (Maldonado et al., 2005;
Brave et al., 2005; Hone, 2006), whereas others reported that emotional
expressions from virtual humans did not help (Prendinger & Ishizuka,
2005), especially when behavioral measure was used (Bickmore & Pi-
card, 2005). Moreover, emotional expressions from virtual humans
could hinder information provision (Berry et al., 2005).
While Beale and Creed (2009) provided a general review on the
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e↵ects of virtual humans’ emotional expressions, in this section we focus
on e↵ects in the context of persuasion. We also introduce the theoretical
foundations on the occurrence of social e↵ects in virtual environments,
including the Computers Are Social Actors (CASA)/Ethopeia concept
and the Threshold Model of Social Influence (TMSI).
2.2.1 Empirical studies
Persuasion
Studies in human-virtual human interaction have demonstrated that
virtual humans are capable of persuasion (Zanbaka, Goolkasian, &
Hodges, 2006; Guadagno et al., 2007; Ochs & Prendinger, 2010; Wang
et al., 2013), but there exists disagreement on whether virtual humans
can utilize their emotional expressions to facilitate persuasion. Ta-
ble 2.2 summarizes existing persuasion studies in human-virtual human
interaction; these studies are also described in detail below.
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Table 2.2: Persuasion studies in human-virtual human interaction
Authors
Research
topic
Emotions
expressed
Dependent
measure
Main finding
Fabri
& Moore
(2005)
Whether
collaboration
with virtual
humans enhances
user experence
Six basic
emotions
(facial
expressions)
Subjective
(self-report user
experience)
Collaboration with
virtual humans
improved user
experiences
Berry
et al.
(2005)
Whether it is
beneficial to
present
information via
(emotional)
virtual humans
Smile vs.
concerned
(facial
expressions)
Subjective
(rating on
perceived
persuasiveness
and self-report
memory)
Virtual humans did
not help information
provision; Emotion
expressions either
hurt or had no e↵ect
Koster
(2006)
Whether an
empathetic
virtual human
is more
persuasive
Empathetic
emotions
Subjective
(self-report
willingness
in buying
a product
Empathetic virtual
humans are more
persuasive
Zanbaka
et al.
(2006)
Whether real
humans are
more persuasive
than virtual
characters
No emotion
Subjective
(self-report
attitudes
Virtual characters
can be as
persuasive as
real humans
Guadagno
et al.
(2007)
E↵ects of agency
and behavioral
realism on
persuasion
No emotion
Subjective
(self-report
attitudes)
Virtual humans high
in behavioral realism
were more
influential;
Gender moderated
the e↵ect of
behavioral realism
Ochs
&
Prendinger
(2010)
Whether virtual
humans can
strategically
use emotion
expressions
to aid
persuasion
Joy and
anger/
empathetic
emotions
(facia
expressions
and
EmoHeart)
Subjective
(perceived
persuasiveness)
Virtual humans
could strategically
use emotion
expressions to
aid persuasion
Khooshabeh
et al.
(2011)
Does it matter
if a computer
jokes
No emotion
Behavioral
(change in
behavior
before and
after
persuasion)
Sense of humor
may aid persuasion
Wang
et al.
(2013)
Whether virtual
humans are
capable of
persuasion when
they make
mistakes
No emotion
Behavioral
(change in
behavior before
and after
persuasion)
Virtual humans are
capable of persuasion
even when they make
mistakes
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Several studies (Fabri &Moore, 2005; Zanbaka et al., 2006; Guadagno
et al., 2007; Khooshabeh, McCall, Gandhe, Gratch, & Blascovich, 2011;
Wang et al., 2013) were conducted in the context of persuasion, but
they did not address the social consequences of virtual humans’ emo-
tional expressions. For instance, in the experiment conducted by Fabri
and Moore (2005), the authors employed a task that is commonly used
in persuasion studies (a survival scenario), and the virtual humans ex-
pressed the six basic emotions. However, participants were not asked to
send persuasive messages, and there was no measurement of the e↵ect
of emotional expressions. The dependent measure was user experience.
The authors reported that collaboration with virtual humans enhanced
user experience.
In the study conducted by Zanbaka et al. (2006), human speakers
and virtual characters (including both humans and non-humans) deliv-
ered persuasive information regarding university-wide comprehensive
exams. The speakers did not express any emotions during the per-
suasive dialog. Attitude was measured using self-report questionnaires.
The goal of the experiment was to study the e↵ect of photorealism. The
authors compared real human speakers and virtual characters, and re-
ported that virtual speakers can be as e↵ective at changing attitudes
as real people.
Guadagno et al. (2007) examined the e↵ects of agency (i.e. whether
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a virtual human is believed to be an agent or an avatar) and behav-
ioral realism on persuasion, without looking at emotional expressions.
Participants listened to a persuasive presentation from a virtual hu-
man. The virtual human advocated a new campus security policy (i.e.,
students are required to carry an identification card to access the cam-
pus grounds and facilities). Attitude was measured using a self-report
questionnaire. Results demonstrated that virtual humans high in be-
havioral realism were more influential than those low in behavioral re-
alism, but this e↵ect was moderated by the gender of the virtual human
and the participant. Although the authors manipulated behavioral real-
ism, they did not explicitly manipulate emotion. In the high behavioral
realism condition, the virtual human maintained mutual gaze with the
participant by moving his or her head to maintain eye contact with the
participant, blinked his or her eyes, and moved his or her lips in synch
with the recorded persuasive communication. The low behavioral real-
ism virtual human did not move his or her head, lips, and did not blink.
As there was no clear emotional information present in these behaviors,
this study was not considered a study on the e↵ect of virtual humans’
emotional expressions.
Using a behavioral task, Khooshabeh et al. (2011) investigated whether
virtual humans with a sense of humor would be more persuasive. In
a survival scenario, participants were asked to rank 15 items with re-
gard to their importance in aiding survival. The authors compared the
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extent to which participants changed their rankings to the direction
of virtual humans’ suggestions when the virtual human demonstrated
a sense of humor, versus when they did not demonstrate a sense of
humor. The humorous virtual human would make jokes such as “We
need oxygen, especially if someone farts!” Results indicated that virtual
humans with a sense of humor can be more persuasive, as long as the
participants perceived the virtual humans to be humorous.
Using the same behavioral task as Khooshabeh et al. (2011), Wang et
al. (2013) demonstrated that virtual humans are capable of persuasion
even when they make conversational mistakes. The authors also exam-
ined whether photorealism had an e↵ect on persuasion, and whether
participants had a gender preference for virtual humans. No e↵ect of
photorealism or gender preference was found in the study.
In summary, the above studies either did not manipulate virtual
humans’ emotional expressions, or did not measure the e↵ects of virtual
humans’ emotional expressions.
Only a few studies investigated the e↵ect of virtual humans’ emo-
tional expressions in persuasion. Berry et al. (2005) empirically eval-
uated a virtual human called GRETA to investigate the importance
of matching emotional expressions with the content of the persuasive
message. To measure persuasion, participants were asked to rate the
virtual humans based on persuasiveness and report what they remem-
bered. A positively framed healthy eating message was created and
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was presented to users in a number of ways (voice-only, text-only, or
via GRETA). Furthermore, variations of GRETA were created such
that additional facial expressions were displayed either consistently or
inconsistently with the content of the message. The authors found
that although GRETA received significantly higher ratings for help-
fulness and likability, presenting the message via GRETA led to the
poorest memory performance among users. On the other hand, when
GRETA’s emotional expressions were consistent with the content of
the verbal message, the negative e↵ect on memory performance disap-
peared. These results suggested that emotional expressions - even when
consistent with the persuasive message - did not increase virtual hu-
mans’ persuasiveness, when compared with other forms of information
provision.
Koster (2006) and Ochs and Prendinger (2010) showed that virtual
humans’ emotional expressions could contribute to their persuasiveness.
Koster (2006) examined the e↵ect of expressing empathetic emotions
in a task where virtual humans attempted to convince participants
to buy an mp3 player. Under the empathetic condition, the virtual
human expressed empathy by saying “I understand you are a busy
person, so I will begin right away”, and “Wouldn’t you love to be able to
listen to your favorite music any place, any time?” while smiling. The
non-empathetic virtual human did not exhibit such behavior. Based
on a self-report questionnaire, participants expressed more willingness
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to buy the mp3 player when the virtual human expressed empathetic
emotions.
Ochs and Prendinger (2010) developed a virtual human that was ca-
pable of strategically displaying an emotion based on the human inter-
actant’s dominance. By default, the virtual human expresses joy. Then
the virtual human makes inferences about the interactant’s dominance
based on his or her emotional responses. If the interactant is dominant,
the virtual human displays empathetic emotions; if the interactant is
submissive, the virtual human expresses anger. The authors compared
this virtual human with ones that only displayed joy/anger/empathetic
emotions. Participants judged this virtual human to be more persua-
sive than the ones that only displayed joy or empathetic emotions, but
not the one that only displayed anger.
Interestingly, Ochs and Prendinger (2010) pointed out that an emo-
tional persuasive virtual character should be able to determine its inter-
locutor’ dominance in order to identify the appropriate emotion to ex-
press. In other words, the authors assumed that recipients’ dominance
would play a role. However, the authors did not directly examine the
e↵ects of dominance and power. Study 2 of this dissertation examined
power as a potential moderator on the e↵ect of emotional expressions
in persuasion.
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Cooperation
In the context of cooperation, Fabri and Moore (2005) examined the
impact of emotional expressions on user experiences in a virtual envi-
ronment. The authors adopted a survival scenario where participants
were asked to rank some items in terms of importance in aiding sur-
vival. Participants first ranked these items individually, then they were
asked to create a joint ranking list with a partner. Both parties were
represented as avatars, and they interacted through a virtual messen-
ger. Participants could click on a button to change their own avatar’s
emotional state. The avatar was capable of expressing the six basic
emotions (i.e., happiness, surprise, anger, fear, sadness, and disgust).
Participants and their partners discussed rankings via text messages.
Results indicated that participants generally enjoyed the experience,
and 11 out of 16 participants achieved better results in the joint rank-
ing process than in the individual ranking process.
It should be noted that although the authors employed a task that
is used in persuasion studies, the study was mainly concerned with
collaboration rather than persuasion. Participants were not asked to
send persuasive messages, and there was no measurement on the e↵ects
of emotional expressions. Participants were simply asked to create a
joint ranking list and report their user experiences.
de Melo et al. (2011b) contrasted cooperative emotional expressions
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versus non-cooperative expressions in the context of cooperation. Par-
ticipants played the iterated prisoner’s dilemma against two di↵erent
virtual humans that followed the same strategy (tit-for-tat), but com-
municated di↵erent goal orientations (cooperative vs. individualistic).
The virtual humans’ goal orientations were conveyed via di↵erent pat-
terns of emotional displays. The authors observed that participants
were able to discern a cooperator from a noncooperator based solely on
emotional displays, and that they cooperated more with the cooperative
virtual human.
According to Van Kleef (2009) and Van Kleef et al. (2010), in cooper-
ative tasks, people are more likely to come to feel each other’s emotions.
There may be higher likelihood of emotional contagion and concomi-
tant a↵ect infusion and mood management processes. Therefore, social
decisions in cooperative situations may be primarily driven by a↵ective
reactions (instead of strategic inferences). The present study adopted
a task that was cooperative.
Education
Maldonado et al. (2005) examined the e↵ect of virtual humans’ emo-
tional expressions on users’ perceptions and performance in a web-based
learning environment. The authors recruited some Japanese partic-
ipants, and asked them questions regarding American idioms. Par-
ticipants were represented as avatars, and they were either alone, or
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paired with a non-emotional virtual peer, or paired with an emotional
virtual peer. Results indicated that the emotional virtual peer was
perceived as more warm, caring, cooperative and trustworthy than the
non-emotional peer. Participants interacting with the emotional vir-
tual peer also performed better in a test than those interacted with a
non-emotional peer.
Burleson and Picard (2007) assessed the potential for an emotion-
ally intelligent virtual learning companion to help children during a
problem solving game. The authors compared di↵erent virtual com-
panions, including one that provided a↵ective support and one that
provided task support (giving hints about how to progress). These
virtual companions were found to be equally e↵ective in terms of par-
ticipants’ feelings of frustration, perseverance, intrinsic motivation, and
learning ability. On the other hand, gender di↵erences were observed;
boys who interacted with the task-support system had more positive
perceptions of the virtual human than boys who interacted with the
a↵ect-support one. Conversely, girls had more positive perceptions of
the virtual human that provided a↵ect support when compared with
those that received task support.
Gaming
Brave et al. (2005) contrasted e↵ects of two types of emotional ex-
pressions: self-oriented and other-oriented-empathic emotion. In their
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experiment, participants played a casino-style blackjack game and were
paired with a virtual human that either exhibited or lacked empathic
emotions. Participants were able to see the virtual human’s face with
a speech bubbles adjacent to the face. After each round of the game,
the virtual human would comment on his or her own performance (e.g.
“I am glad I won”), followed by a comment on the participants perfor-
mance (e.g. “I am glad you won”). In the empathic condition, the vir-
tual human expressed emotions while commenting on the participants’
performance. A positive emotion was expressed if the participants had
won, and a negative emotion was expressed if the participants had lost.
Results indicated that participants perceived the empathetic virtual
human to be more caring, likeable, trustworthy, and submissive, and
they felt more supported during the interaction. In contrast, there did
not seem to be a di↵erence on the perception of the virtual human’s
dominance and intelligence, and participants did not feel more positive
when interacting with the empathetic virtual human.
Prendinger and Ishizuka (2005) investigated the e↵ect of empathetic
emotional expressions in a mathematical game. Participants were asked
to play a mathematical quiz while having their galvanic skin response
and blood volume pressure measured. One group of participants in-
teracted with an empathetic virtual human, whereas the other group
interacted with a non-empathetic virtual human. The empathetic vir-
tual human smiled when the participants answered a question correctly,
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and appeared sorry when questions were answered incorrectly. In con-
trast, the non-emotional virtual human only replied with right or wrong
without showing any emotions. The authors reported that participants
interacting with the empathetic virtual human did not find the interac-
tion to be more or less di cult, frustrating, or enjoyable. Furthermore,
expressions of empathy did not seem to influence comprehension or
recall of information. On the other hand, one physiological measure
yielded a significant e↵ect; the skin conductance of participants in the
empathetic condition was significantly lower than that in the other con-
dition, indicating that the empathetic virtual human may have helped
reduce participants’ stress level.
In the study conducted by Hone (2006), participants played a mouse-
operated bat and ball game where the they had to knock a ball around
the playing area. Players were given a total of four lives at the beginning
of the game, and they lost one life if the bat missed the ball. The game
was designed to frustrate. For example, the ball was programmed to
travel at random speeds and in random directions; sometimes the ball
would pass through the bat; and occasionally the bat would respond
slowly as if the network connection is slow. Participants were o↵ered an
incentive if they beat a high score which was supposedly achieved by a
16 year old boy. Participants were instructed to click on icon whenever
they feel frustrated. When the button is clicked, participants in the
empathetic condition would see a virtual human providing empathetic
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feedback, whereas those in the non-empathetic condition would only
receive a confirmation of the click. Participants were allowed to play
the game for as long as they wanted. When they finished playing, their
frustration level was recorded. Results indicated that the empathetic
virtual human was able to reduce frustration.
Decision making
Bickmore and Picard (2005) developed a virtual human named Laura
and intended her to interact with participants on a daily basis to help
improve participants’ exercise habits. Laura employed a number of
strategies that humans use to establish and maintain relationships, in-
cluding social, empathetic and polite communication, talk of the rela-
tionship, humor and appropriate forms of address. Additionally, Laura
used a range of non-verbal behaviors including hand gestures, gazing
at and away from the participant, raising and lowering of eye-brows,
head nods, and walking on and o↵ the screen. Results from this study
showed that participants liked Laura more when she used relational
strategies, and formed a closer bond with her. However, on the other
hand, the use of relational strategies did not help Laura to achieve an
agreement with participants on the goals or execution of the therapy.
Liu and Picard (2005) studied e↵ects of emotional expressions by
observing participants’ attitudes and behavior while interacting with
a mobile health device. One group of participants interacted with an
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empathetic version of the device for 4 days then switched to a non-
empathetic version for the remaining 4 days. The other group did the
opposite. A virtual human discussed health-related issues with the
participants at various times. In the empathetic version, the virtual
human made empathetic comments; whereas in the non-empathetic
version, the virtual human did not make any empathetic comments. At
the end of the interaction, a significant portion of participants indicated
that they would prefer to continue interacting with the empathetic
device.
2.2.2 Theories
Several theories have been proposed to explain social influence of virtual
humans. The Computers Are Social Actors (CASA) concept and the
Ethopeia concept (Nass, Steuer, & Tauber, 1994; Nass & Moon, 2000)
suggest that we respond socially to computers because we automatically
and unconsciously treat computers as social actors. On the other hand,
the Threshold Model of Social Influence (Blascovich, 2002a) proposes
that five factors jointly determine the social influence of virtual humans,
i.e., agency, communicative realism, response system, self-relevance,
and context. Below we introduce these two concepts in detail.
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Computers Are Social Actors (CASA)
Reeves and Nass (1996) tried to explain our interaction with virtual
humans from an evolutionary perspective: The human brain developed
at a time when only human beings were able to show social behavior,
and when every person and every place was a real person and a real
place. To deal successfully with daily life, the human brain developed
automatic responses, which are still in use today.
Therefore, people still automatically accept persons and places as
real (Gilbert, 1991). “When our brains automatically respond socially
and naturally because of the characteristics of media or the situations in
which they are used, there is often little to remind us that the experience
is unreal. Absent a significant warning that we have been fooled, our
old brains hold sway and we accept media as real people and places.”
(Reeves & Nass, 1996, p. 12).
Nass and Moon (2000) emphasized this point of mindlessly apply-
ing social rules and expectations to computers. Mindlessness (Langer,
1992; Langer & Moldoveanu, 2000) can be best understood as the fail-
ure to draw novel distinctions. These automatic responses to contextual
social cues trigger scripts and expectations, making active information
processing impossible.
Moreover, Sundar and Nass (2000) assumed that people not only
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respond mindlessly, but also have the tendency to use cognitive short-
cuts and heuristics (Kahneman & Tversky, 1974). Consequently, peo-
ple use the easily accessible social rules from human-human interaction
and apply them to human-computer interaction - due to the perceived
functional similarity between humans and computers.
Nass and colleagues successfully replicated findings for many social
rules in areas of person perception, politeness, reciprocal self-disclosure,
reciprocal assistance and in-group and out-group stereotypes. With re-
gard to person perception, Nass et al. (1994) reported that a computer
that criticized the participants was rated as more competent than a
computer that praised the participants. Although participants denied
having gender stereotypes or being influenced by the voice of the com-
puter, the execution of gender stereotypes was observed. Later, Nass
et al. (1997) found that computers with a female voice were rated as
more competent in the topic of love and relationships, and conversely,
computers with a male voice were rated as more competent with re-
gard to computers and technology. Furthermore, computers that made
a compliment to the participants were rated more positively (Fogg &
Nass, 1997), even when participants knew that the compliments were
assigned randomly and not intentionally. With regard to reciprocal
self-disclosure, (Moon, 2000) found that participants revealed more in-
timate information about themselves when the computer revealed in-
formation about itself first.
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Based on these observations, Nass and colleagues (Nass et al., 1997;
Nass & Moon, 2000) concluded that people automatically and un-
consciously react to computers in the same way as they do towards
other humans. Nass and colleagues reject the explanation that people
consciously anthropomorphize computers, because participants in their
studies consistently denied doing so. The authors showed empirically
that people do not think of the programmer when they show social reac-
tions. In fact, all participants denied reacting in any social way towards
computers and stated that this behavior would be inappropriate.
More recently, scientists discovered that we respond to virtual hu-
mans’ emotional expressions in a way that is similar to humans’ emo-
tional expressions. de Melo et al. (2011a) replicated e↵ects of humans’
emotional expressions in the context negotiation (i.e., people concede
more to an angry negotiator than a happy one, see Van Kleef et al.,
2004b, 2004a; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006) using virtual humans’ emo-
tional expressions. Participants in their study were made aware that
they were interacting with computer agents instead of real humans.
Results indicated that virtual humans’ emotional expressions elicited
the same e↵ects as real human’s emotional expressions, although later
it was pointed out e↵ects elicited by virtual humans’ emotional expres-
sions might be weaker than those elicited by real humans’ (de Melo et
al., 2013). Nonetheless, based on these findings, we expect that virtual
humans’ emotional expression may have similar e↵ects on persuasion
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as real humans’ emotional expressions.
Threshold Model of Social Influence (TMSI)
The Threshold Model of Social Influence (TMSI, Blascovich, 2002a)
has challenged Nass’ theory by suggesting that people may respond
di↵erently to humans versus machines.
TMSI involves interactions among five major dimensions or factors
including: Agency, Communicative Realism, Response System, Self-
Relevance, and Context. In short, this theory argues that if people
believe the virtual human is driven by another human, and the virtual
human is behaving realistically, the virtual human’s social influence will
be high unless people are over-thinking, or not motivated.
To illustrate, if agency is high (i.e., the virtual representation is
believed to be an avatar), then neither high communicative realism nor
deliberate response system level are necessary for social influence e↵ects
to occur. Hence, an avatar representation that is merely a frowning face
can elicit negative a↵ect as evidenced by automatic user behaviors such
as a returned frown or in terms of a consciously delivered user response
such as a “Thank you!”. On the other hand, if agency is low (i.e.,
the user believes the representation is an agent), then social influence
will occur as a function of communicative realism (e.g., high movement
realism) for deliberate user responses such as occur during conversation.
High levels of communicative realism are not necessary for automatic
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or unconscious user responses even to an agent.
The fourth factor - self-relevance - ranges from high to low and can
be thought of simply as the personal meaningfulness of a social inter-
action. This is as true in physical or grounded reality as in immersive
virtual environments. Some social interactions are casual or are rela-
tively unimportant transactions. Some are more important, especially
when they invite evaluations by others such as task performances. Some
are very important; for example, the development of a romantic rela-
tionship.
Finally, the fifth factor in the model is context. Factors underlying
context include ecological complexity and behavioral options. These
factors help determine directly the minimum level of communicative
realism that is necessary for the kind of social interaction appropri-
ate to the context, and, hence, the level of social influence within it.
For example, if one plays games in an immersive virtual environment,
communicative realism, at least in terms of anthropometric and pho-
torealism can be low, and players will still become quite immersed
because the information exchange and the movements one can make
are typically delimited.
Several studies have compared the e↵ects of agents and avatars, but
their results are not consistent and to some extent contradictory. For
instance, Guadagno et al. (2007) examined the e↵ects of agency and
behavioral realism on persuasion and found some supporting results for
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the importance of agency. Participants in the high behavioral realism
group experienced more social presence and, moreover, participants in
the avatar group experienced more social presence than subjects in the
agent group. However, the lack of interaction e↵ects between behavioral
realism and agency suggests that the assumptions of the model cannot
be supported.
Hoyt, Blascovich, and Swinth (2003) demonstrated classic e↵ects of
social inhibition when participants were asked to perform a non-trained
task in front of an avatar compared to an agent. Conversely, they did
not find e↵ects of social facilitation when participants performed well-
trained tasks in front of an avatar.
Supporting results for behavioral realism are given by Bailenson,
Blascovich, Beall, and Loomis (2001) who demonstrated that behavior
realism with regard to natural proximity behavior is crucial: only when
a virtual agent follows the user with its eyes does the user maintain a
distance that would also be expected in a human-human interaction.
Bailenson, Blascovich, Beall, and Loomis (2003) replicated this finding
and found additionally that - at least for female participants - the
pattern expected by the threshold model emerged.
On the other hand, several studies failed to observe an e↵ect of
agency, and the authors favored Nass and colleagues’ theory. Nowak
and Biocca (2003) conducted a study about the influence of agency
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and anthropomorphism. Participants believed that they were inter-
acting either with an agent or an avatar. Additionally, the degree
of anthropomorphism was varied from no picture (control group), ab-
stract eyes and mouth (low anthropomorphism) to a realistic picture
of a virtual character (high anthropomorphism). Agency showed no
e↵ects on the perceived degree of co-presence or social presence, but
participants reported increased social presence when confronted with
a high anthropomorphic picture compared to a low anthropomorphic
picture. In summary, the authors see their results in line with the thesis
of Reeves and Nass (1996): “Although no real conclusions can be made
with non-significant di↵erences, these results are consistent with sev-
eral other studies that suggest that participants respond to computers
socially, or in ways that are similar to their responses to other humans”
(Nowak & Biocca, 2003, p. 490).
Aharoni and Fridlund (2007) also investigated the influence of agency.
Participants in their study interacted with a computer with pre-recorded
speech output. Participants believed that they were either interacting
with a human interviewer or an artificial intelligent computer. The
authors reported that participants used more silence fillers and smiled
more while interacting with the human interviewer compared to the
computer. However, on the other hand, the evaluation of the inter-
viewer as well as the subjective emotional state of the participants was
not a↵ected by agency.
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With regard to these experiments and their results, it can be summa-
rized that there is some empirical evidence for the thesis that avatars
elicit stronger social e↵ects than agents, but it is not shown consis-
tently. In contrast, the factor behavioral realism seems to be of greater
importance.
2.2.3 Summary
Studies in human-virtual human interaction have demonstrated that
virtual humans are capable of persuasion (Guadagno et al., 2007; Ochs
& Prendinger, 2010; Wang et al., 2013), but there exists disagreement
on whether virtual humans can utilize their emotional expressions to
facilitate persuasion. The present study explored e↵ects of virtual hu-
mans’ emotional expressions, and examined potential moderators such
as power and perceived appropriateness.
2.3 The Lunar Survival Task
The Lunar Survival Task has been used to study persuasion (e.g. Khooshabeh
et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2013) and was employed in this study.
In the Lunar Survival Task, participants are informed that they have
crash landed on the moon and need to choose items to get back to a
life-saving rendezvous point. Additionally, they are told that another
crew member is also present. The other crew member knows the ship’s
inventory well.
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Prior to any interaction with the other crew member, participants
are asked to provide initial rankings on fifteen items such as oxygen and
food concentrate (a complete list of items and NASA’s expert rankings
can be found in Table 3.1 on page 82). Then the participants are en-
couraged to discuss rankings with the other crew member. Participants
can decide how to use information from the discussion. If they want,
they can make changes to their initial rankings.
Persuasion can be measured by calculating the amount of changes
the participants have made after interaction with their crew member.
More changes indicate more persuasion.
Previous studies have manipulated a number of factors in this task.
For example, Fabri and Moore (2005) contrasted a virtual crew mem-
ber that expressed emotions with one that did not express any emo-
tions. Khooshabeh et al. (2011) observed e↵ects when the crew member
demonstrated a sense of humor. Wang et al. (2013) examined conse-
quences when the crew member made verbal mistakes.
In this study, we implemented the task with a virtual crew member,
and we manipulated factors including the facial expressions of the crew
member (Study 1 & 2), power of the crew member (Study 2), the
perceived appropriateness of the crew member’s emotional expressions
(Study 2), and the photorealism level of the virtual crew member (Study
3).
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2.4 Amazon Mechanical Turk
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) was started in 2005 as a service to
“crowdsource” labor intensive tasks and is now being used as a source
of subjects for experimental research.
In MTurk, requesters post tasks that are visible only to workers
who meet predefined criteria (e.g., country of residence or accuracy
in previously completed tasks). When workers access the website, they
find a list of tasks sortable according to various criteria, including size of
the reward and maximum time allotted for the completion. Workers can
read brief descriptions and see previews of the tasks before accepting
to work on them. Workers and requesters are anonymous.
Tasks are typically brief such as image tagging, audio transcriptions,
and survey completion. Rewards can be as low as $0.01, and rarely
exceed $1.
A demographic analysis conducted in February 2010 by Paolacci,
Chandler, and Ipeirotis (2010) revealed that among U.S.-based work-
ers (N=470)1, there were more females (64.85%) than males (35.15%),
and the average age of U.S.-based workers was 36.0 years (min =
18,max = 81,median = 33). The (self-reported) educational level
of U.S. workers was higher than the general population, which can be
partially explained by the younger age of Mechanical Turk users but
1The authors recruited 1000 participants, however only 47% were based in the U.S..
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may also reflect higher education levels among early adopters of tech-
nology. Despite being more educated, these workers reported lower
income. Only 13.8% of U.S.-based workers reported that MTurk was
their primary source of income. On the other hand, 69.6% of U.S.-based
workers reported that they consider Mechanical Turk is a fruitful way
to spend free time (e.g., instead of watching TV). Nevertheless, the
author pointed out that the demographics of MTurk were changing
rapidly, and there was a need for an updated survey.
In summary, MTurk o↵ers a streamlined process of study design,
participant recruitment, and data collection. Although participation is
a↵ected by compensation rate and task length, participants can be re-
cruited rapidly and inexpensively. And more importantly, Buhrmester,
Kwang, and Gosling (2011) suggested that realistic compensation rates
do not a↵ect data quality; the data obtained are at least as reliable as
those obtained via traditional methods. In conclusion, MTurk can be
used to obtain high-quality data inexpensively and rapidly (Buhrmester
et al., 2011).
Participants from this study were recruited from MTurk, and all
participants were based in the U.S..
Given that online participants may not pay as much attention as
those from the laboratories, we adopted an “attention-check” strategy
(Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). Three attention-check
questions were inserted into the task, which are:
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1. Please answer “3” to this question.
(The correct answer is 3.)
2. Please check this box to continue.
(Participants should check the box.)
3. (At the end of instructions) If you have read all the instructions,
please select group 1 in the question below.
(Later among the questions) Please select a group if you wish to be
assigned to a survey group. Leave it blank to be randomly assigned to
a group.
(The correct answer is 1.)
If a participant fails two out of three attention-check questions, it is
likely that he or she did not read the instructions/questions, and his or
her responses may not be valid. To ensure the validity of data, partic-
ipants who failed two or more attention-check questions were excluded
from data analysis.
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Chapter 3
Study 1: E↵ects of Virtual Hu-
mans’ Facial Emotional Displays on
Persuasion
Study 1 examined whether a virtual human’s facial emotional displays
have an e↵ect on persuasion.
Participants were invited to take part in a problem-solving game
(i.e., the Lunar Survival Task) with a virtual human. All participants
played the role of a leader. Half of the participants interacted with a
virtual follower that did not express any emotions, whereas the other
half communicated with one that displayed happy/angry facial expres-
sions following the Carror-and-Stick approach. We hypothesized that
when the virtual human displays emotions, participants would be more
persuaded. In other words:
Hypothesis 1: A virtual human’s facial emotional displays help per-
suasion.
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3.1 Literature review
The past decades have seen more and more virtual humans being em-
ployed to present persuasive information including new policies (Guadagno
et al., 2007), healthy eating habits (Berry et al., 2005), and advertise-
ments (Koster, 2006).
What are the benefits of presenting persuasive information via emo-
tional virtual humans?
According to a study conducted by Berry et al. (2005), presenting
information via an emotional virtual human is not necessarily more
e↵ective than presenting information by text or voice. In the best case
scenario, presenting information via an emotional virtual human is as
e↵ective as text/voice, and that is when the virtual human’s emotional
expressions match the content of the persuasive message.
Others disagree. Koster (2006) and Ochs and Prendinger (2010)
argued that emotional virtual humans can be an e↵ective means to
persuade, and certain strategies can be adopted to enhance persuasion.
For instance, Koster (2006) demonstrated that expressing empathetic
emotion could contribute to virtual humans’ persuasiveness; in their ex-
periment, an empathetic virtual human was perceived to be more per-
suasive than a non-empathetic one. Later, Ochs and Prendinger (2010)
discussed several ways to enhance persuasion. First, if the persuasive
message can be matched with an emotion, virtual humans can express
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that emotion to match the content of the persuasive message. Second,
virtual humans may try to elicit certain emotions from the recipient,
so that the recipient would be in an emotional state that facilitates the
acceptance of the persuasive message. Third, virtual humans can infer
the recipient’s dominance, and choose to display anger or empathetic
emotions accordingly. The authors developed a virtual human that was
capable of displaying anger or empathetic emotions based on the inter-
actant’s dominance. If the interactant is dominant, the virtual human
would display empathetic emotions; if the interactant is submissive,
the virtual human would express anger. The authors reported that this
virtual human was judged to be more persuasive than one that only
displayed joy or empathetic emotions.
In conclusion, previous studies have shown that emotional expres-
sions could either undermine persuasion (Berry et al., 2005) or help
persuasion (Koster, 2006; Ochs & Prendinger, 2010). So far it is still
unclear whether virtual humans can utilize emotional expressions to aid
persuasion. As pointed out by Beale and Creed (2009), existing results
regarding virtual humans’ emotional expressions are often inconclusive
and contradictory, and it is essential that more research studies focus
on this area.
Therefore, we conducted Study 1 to investigate whether virtual hu-
mans can use emotional expressions to help persuasion. In Study 1,
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participants and virtual humans engaged in a collaborative problem-
solving game. Participants were asked to first solve the problem inde-
pendently, then they discussed answers with a virtual human. During
the discussion, the virtual human attempted to persuade the partici-
pants to change their answers. It was emphasized to the participants
that although the virtual human is knowledgeable, it is up to them
whether to listen to the virtual human’s suggestions. To give par-
ticipants full decision power, they were assigned the role of a leader.
Persuasion was measured by calculating the amount of changes the par-
ticipants made after discussion. Half of the participants interacted with
a virtual human that expressed emotions following the Carrot-and-Stick
strategy; according to this strategy, the virtual human displays a happy
facial expression when the participants’ answers are close to the expert
answers, and an angry facial expression when the participants’ answers
are very di↵erent from the expert answers. We hypothesized that the
virtual human’s emotional expressions would help persuasion.
Hypothesis 1: A virtual human who expresses emotions is more per-
suasive than one that does not express emotions.
3.2 Design
Study 1 used a between-subject design. Participants were randomly as-
signed to two conditions: In the non-emotional condition, participants
interacted with a virtual human who remained in neutral expression at
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all times; whereas in the emotional condition, participants communi-
cated with one that expressed happiness and anger based on the Carrot-
and-Stick strategy. A happy facial expression was displayed when the
participants’ answers were close to the expert answers, whereas an an-
gry facial expression was shown when the participants’ answers were
very di↵erent from the expert answers.
In both conditions, the virtual human asked the participants to
change their answers to match the expert answers. Participants were
not told these were expert answers.
Fig. 3.1 shows some sample images of the virtual humans used in
Study 1. These images were obtained from the Cohn-Kanade Facial
Database (Kanade, Cohn, & Tian, 2000; Lucey et al., 2010), as this
database provides reliably labeled happy and angry facial images. An-
other reason to choose real photographs over computer-generated im-
ages was to avoid the Uncanny Valley (Mori, MacDorman, & Kageki,
2012). According to the Uncanny Valley, virtual humans that look
and move almost, but not exactly, like real human beings may cause a
response of revulsion.
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Figure 3.1: Study 1 Virtual humans
3.3 Method
3.3.1 Participants
A total of 555 participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk) to participate in Study 1 for monetary reward. All par-
ticipants resided in the United States. The sample had an average
age of 31.0 (SD=10.06) with 47.8% females. Caucasians comprised
77.1% of the population, whereas the remainder consisted of Asians
(9.1%), African Americans (8.1%), Hispanic Americans (4.7%), and
Native Americans (1.0%). Fourteen responses were removed because
they may be invalid (see section 2.4, page 71 for details). Six outliers
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were excluded from analysis because their scores on the dependent mea-
sure were greater than 3 SDs away from the mean. Eventually 535 data
points remained for analysis1.
The average age of participants in Study 1 (M=31.0) was younger
than that reported by Paolacci and colleagues (M=36.0, see Paolacci
et al., 2010). Female participants comprised a smaller portion (47.8%)
than a previously reported number (64.85%, Paolacci et al., 2010). This
di↵erence in age and gender ratio suggests that the demographics of
MTurk may be changing. Paolacci et al. (2010) conducted the survey
in February 2010 and sampled 470 U.S.-based participants. Study 1
was conducted three years later, through October 2013 to December
2013, and was based on 555 U.S.-based participants. As Paolacci et al.
(2010) pointed out, the population dynamics on MTurk were changing
significantly, and there was a need for an updated survey.
3.3.2 Procedure and materials
The Lunar Survival Task was implemented in Qualtrics2, with the
human-virtual human chatting module developed separately then em-
bedded as a Javascript application in Qualtrics. Participants were first
recruited via MTurk then redirected to Qualtrics. Participants were
1Out of the 535 participants, 20 participants did not make any changes (by design, the participants
had to perform a task to maintain their original rankings). A separate data analysis was performed
with these 20 participants excluded. Results can be found in Appendix A.1, on page 152.
2http://www.qualtrics.com/
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blind to the purpose of the study; they were simply invited to “partici-
pate in a problem-solving game with a virtual teammate”. Participants
were not told whether the virtual teammate was driven by a computer
program or another human being. The MTurk invitation and Qualtrics
questionnaire can be found in Appendix B.1.
After being redirected to Qualtrics, participants saw a welcome mes-
sage, and were given brief information regarding the number of ques-
tions in the survey and estimated time of completion (15 minutes).
Then participants started out by answering basic demographic ques-
tions including age, gender, and ethnicity.
Next, each participant was asked to imagine that he or she had crash
landed on the moon and needed to choose items to trek 200 km back to
the mothership. Fifteen items were provided (Table 3.1; participants
where not given NASA’s expert rankings or NASA’s reasonings), and
the participant was asked to rank the items based on importance in
aiding survival. Fig. 3.2 shows a screenshot of the interface for ranking
the items.
Participants first ranked the fifteen items independently (without
discussing with their virtual teammate). These rankings reflected par-
ticipants’ opinion prior to the persuasive dialog, and were recorded by
the computer program as “pre-rankings”.
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Table 3.1: Items in the Lunar Survival Task and NASA’s expert rankings
Item
NASA
ranking
NASA’s reasoning
Box of matches 15
Virtually worthless - there’s no oxygen on the
moon to sustain combustion
Food concentrate 4
E cient means of supplying energy
requirements
50 feet of nylon rope 6
Useful in scaling cli↵s and tying injured
together
Parachute silk 8 Protection from the sun’s rays
Portable heating unit 13 Not needed unless on the dark side
Two .45 calibre
pistols
11 Possible means of self-propulsion
One case of
dehydrated milk
12 Bulkier duplication of food concentrate
Two 100 lb. tanks
of oxygen
1
Most pressing survival need (weight is not a
factor since gravity is one-sixth of the Earth’s
- each tank would weigh only about 17 lbs.
on the moon)
Stellar map 3
Primary means of navigation - star patterns
appear essentially identical on the moon as
on Earth
Self-inflating life
raft
9
CO2 bottle in military raft may be used for
propulsion
Magnetic compass 14
The magnetic field on the moon is not
polarized, so it’s worthless for navigation
5 gallons of water 2
Needed for replacement of tremendous liquid
loss on the light side
Signal flares 10
Use as distress signal when the mother ship
is sighted
First aid kit,
including
injection needle
7
Needles connected to vials of vitamins,
medicines, etc. will fit special aperture in
NASA space suit
Solar-powered FM
receiver-transmitter
5
For communication with mother ship (but
FM requires line-of-sight transmission and
can only be used over short ranges)
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After the pre-rankings were recorded, each participant was encour-
aged to discuss rankings with a virtual teammate who knows the in-
ventory well, and that everyone’s survival depends on reaching the life-
saving rendezvous point. Therefore, the task was cooperative; every-
one’s goal was cooperatively linked. The participant was told that he or
she is the leader, and the virtual teammate is his or her follower. It was
emphasized that the participant should decide how to use information
from their virtual teammate, and he or she could update rankings at
any given time before submitting final decisions.
The participant then saw the chatting interface, which included an
image of the virtual teammate, the virtual teammate’s name (randomly
selected from a pool of ten popular names), and a chat box where the
participant could send and receive information via text (Fig. 3.3). The
application randomly assigned one out of three virtual humans to each
participant.
When participants first started chatting, the virtual teammate ap-
peared with a neutral expression (Fig. 3.3). Participants were randomly
assigned to one out of two conditions. In the non-emotional condition,
the virtual teammate remained in the neutral expression all the time.
In the emotional condition, the virtual teammate displayed an angry
or happy facial expressions depending on participants’ rankings. If the
participant ranked an item very di↵erently from NASA’s expert rank-
ing (i.e., greater than four ranks away; for example, if the participant
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Figure 3.2: Interface for ranking the items
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Figure 3.3: Interface for interacting with the virtual human
Figure 3.4: Study 1 Anger expression
The virtual teammate expresses anger when the participant ranks an item very di↵erently from
NASA’s ranking.
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Figure 3.5: Study 1 Happiness expression
The virtual teammate expresses happiness when the participant ranks an item correctly.
ranked oxygen 5 to 15, it would be considered very di↵erent from 1, and
would elicit an anger expression, as seen in Fig. 3.4). If the participant
ranked an item similarly to NASA’s expert ranking (i.e. within one
rank; for example, the participant ranked oxygen 1 or 2), the virtual
teammate would display a happy expression (Fig. 3.5). When the above
conditions were not met, or when a new question was being asked, the
virtual teammate appeared in neutral expression. Transition between
di↵erent expressions was achieved by smoothly fading out the old ex-
pression while fading in the new expression. The transition would take
about 2 seconds, and there was no jiggling during the process (all facial
images were resized/aligned).
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In both conditions, the virtual human suggested the participant to
change his or her ranking to match NASA’s expert ranking. For ex-
ample, in Fig. 3.4, the participant was discussing ranking of oxygen
with the virtual human, and the virtual human told the participant:
“You should rank it 1”. The only exception is when participants al-
ready ranked an item correctly, in which case the virtual human would
respond “Good job!” with a happy expression (Fig. 3.5).
The virtual human did not give any reasoning for the rankings he
or she suggested, nor did the virtual human tell participants that the
rankings suggested were NASA’s expert rankings. The virtual human
simply told the participants to, for example, “rank it 1”. This way,
we know that we were measuring the virtual human’s persuasiveness,
rather than NASA’s persuasiveness, or the perceived validity of the
reasoning.
Participants asked questions by selecting questions from a pre-determined
list. The virtual human’s text responses were pre-programmed and were
the same across conditions. To make the interaction more realistic, a
delay of 2.5 seconds was introduced before the virtual teammate an-
swered each question.
Each participant was required to ask at least three questions, but
there was no upper limit. When the participant finalized the rankings,
the computer recorded these as “post-rankings”. These post-rankings
were later compared with pre-rankings to assess persuasion. Finally,
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the participant was asked questions regarding his or her experience
including how expressive he or she judged the follower to be, were
thanked and given instructions for receiving payment.
3.3.3 Dependent measure
The dependent measure is a numeric score indicating how much change
each participant had made after receiving persuasive information. The
score is calculated by computing the di↵erence between the pre- and
post-rankings. More specifically, there are a total of fifteen items, and
each item is assigned a unique number between 1 and 15 as an indication
of its ranking (with 1 being the top ranking/the most important item).
This turns the pre- and post-rankings into two fifteen-dimensional vec-
tors. The dependent measure - namely Change Score - is calculated by
computing the Euclidean distance between the two vectors. Precisely:
ChangeScore =
qP15
i=1(InitialRankingitemi   FinalRankingitemi)2
Higher change scores imply more persuasion, whereas lower change
scores indicate less persuasion.
In the example below (Table 3.2), the dependent measure is calcu-
lated as follows:
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ChangeScore =
p
(14  14)2 + (3  3)2 + (12  11)2 + (11  12)2
+(6  8)2 + (13  13)2 + (7  9)2 + (1  1)2 + (9  4)2 + (10  10)2
+(15  15)2 + (2  2)2 + (4  7)2 + (8  6)2 + (5  5)2
=
p
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= 6.93
Table 3.2: Example for calculating the Change Score
Item
Pre-ranking
(1=The most important)
Post-ranking
(1=The most important)
Box of matches 14 14
Food concentrate 3 3
50 feet of nylon rope 12 11
Parachute silk 11 12
Portable heating unit 6 8
Two .45 calibre pistols 13 13
One case of
dehydrated milk
7 9
Two 100 lb. tanks
of oxygen
1 1
Stellar map 9 4
Self-inflating life raft 10 10
Magnetic compass 15 15
5 gallons of water 2 2
Signal flares 4 7
First aid kit, including
injection needle
8 6
Solar-powered FM
receiver-transmitter
5 5
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3.4 Results and discussion
3.4.1 Manipulation check
At the end of the survey, participants were asked to rate their teammate
based on expressiveness on a scale from 1 to 11 (with 1 being extremely
inexpressive and 11 being extremely expressive). Participants under the
emotional condition had a higher rating (M=7.3, SD=2.29) than those
under the non-emotional condition (M=6.2, SD=2.66), with t(533) =
5.14, p < .001. Thus, the emotional virtual human was perceived as
more expressive than the non-emotional virtual human.
The purpose of this test was to examine whether the emotional vir-
tual human was perceived as relatively more expressive than the non-
emotional one. Since there was no definition on what is absolute expres-
sive or inexpressive, participants may have perceived the non-emotional
virtual human to be somewhat expressive because the non-emotional
virtual human verbally expressed his/her opinions and made requests
such as “You should rank it 1!”. Furthermore, participants were asked
to rate the expressiveness of the interactive virtual human, as opposed
to rate how emotional is a static facial image. Therefore, the non-
emotional virtual human being rated as somewhat expressive does not
imply that the neutral facial images were emotional. These ratings are
meaningful with regard to the overall expressiveness of the interactive
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virtual human (where both verbal and non-verbal behavior could con-
tribute to expressiveness). The di↵erence in rating (7.3 vs. 6.2) may
only mean facial displays contributed 1.1 points with regard to the over-
all expressiveness of the virtual human (as opposed to with regard to
facial emotional displays).
3.4.2 E↵ects of emotional expressions
Results indicated that virtual humans’ emotional expressions had an
e↵ect on persuasion, F (1, 533) = 16.29, p < .001. However, contrary to
our prediction, participants who interacted with an emotional virtual
human were less persuaded (Mean Change Score = 9.11, SD = 6.059)
than those who communicated with a non-emotional virtual human (M
= 11.23, SD = 6.004; see Fig 3.6 and Table 3.3).
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Figure 3.6: Study 1 Main e↵ect of Emotional Expression
Error bars represent standard errors.
Table 3.3: Study 1 results
Dependent measure = Change Score
N Mean SD SE 95% Confidence Interval for Mean
Non-emotional 298 11.23 6.059 .351 (10.54, 11.92)
Emotional 237 9.11 6.004 .390 (8.35, 9.87)
Total 535 10.29 6.121 .265 (9.77, 10.81)
Why did emotional expressions reduce - instead of help - persuasion?
To understand how anger and happiness expressions separately con-
tributed to the observed e↵ect, we conducted a separate study. We
contrasted happiness vs. no emotion, but did not find a main e↵ect
of happiness expressions, F (1, 97) = 1.94, p = 0.167(ns). We also con-
trasted anger with no emotion, but did not find a main e↵ect of anger
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expressions, F (1, 109) = 1.16, p = 0.285(ns).
We rule out the explanation of the Uncanny Valley (Mori et al.,
2012) as participants in our study judged the emotional virtual human
to be more expressive. If the Uncanny Valley had occurred, participants
would perceive the virtual human to be creepy instead of expressive.
We resort to literature in social science, which suggested that emo-
tional expressions on one hand may help in certain circumstances, while
on the other hand may backfire if considered inappropriate. For exam-
ple, in the context of negotiation, anger expressions are hypothesized to
be inappropriate (Adam et al., 2010), and powerful negotiators retaliate
when they see inappropriate anger expressions (Van Kleef et al., 2006).
While this e↵ect has not been shown in the context of persuasion, it
may be the cause.
According to comments provided by participants in Study 1 (see
Appendix C.1 on page 164), some participants were less willing to make
changes because they were in power. For example:
“Ultimately, I am the person in charge. I have to make the decision
based on what I think is right. In this situation, if I am the person
in charge, it must mean I have more experience than the other crew
member.”
“I think she wanted to live, thats why she wanted to give her insight
on what should be first and what should be last. but im still the o cer
so i did the last part because i too wanted to live and i gave her a chance
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to express her self.”
“I listened to what the other crew member said and agreed with her
choices on a few of the rankings but the final decision was mine So I
did what i thought best. I agreed about the water and the food. We were
close a on few items too.”
Therefore, it is plausible that participants in Study 1 were in charge
and they did not like their subservient teammate to persuade them
using facial expressions. To unpack this e↵ect, a second study is needed
where participants are not in power. Therefore, Study 2 was conducted
to investigate the role of power and perceived appropriateness of the
emotional expressions in the context of persuasion.
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Chapter 4
Study 2: Emotional Display, Power,
and Appropriateness
Study 1 demonstrated that a virtual human’s emotional expressions re-
duced his or her persuasiveness. We speculated that participants who
were playing the role of a leader considered it inappropriate for the
subservient virtual human to express emotions, and they retaliated by
rejecting information from the virtual human. Following this theory,
emotional expressions would only reduce persuasion when the observer
is in power, and when these emotional expressions are considered in-
appropriate. In other words, the e↵ect of a virtual human’s emotional
expressions is jointly determined by power and perceived appropriate-
ness of the emotional expressions. Using the same persuasion task from
Study 1, we tested Hypothesis 2:
The e↵ect of virtual humans’ facial emotional displays on persua-
sion is jointly determined by power and perceived appropriateness of
the emotional displays.
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4.1 Literature review
Social science studies have suggested that in the context of negotiation,
power and perceived appropriateness moderate the e↵ect of anger ex-
pressions (Van Kleef & Coˆte´, 2007). In short, negotiators who are in
power are able to use anger expressions to their advantage, assuming
these emotional expressions are considered appropriate. However, when
negotiators who are not in power try to use anger to gain more value,
these emotional expressions backfire unless considered appropriate.
While this e↵ect has not been observed in the context of persuasion,
several studies have implied that observers’ dominance may play a role.
Ochs and Prendinger (2010) pointed out that an emotional persuasive
virtual character should be able to determine its interlocutor’s domi-
nance in order to identify the appropriate emotion to express. The au-
thors developed a virtual human that was capable of adopting di↵erent
strategies based on the human interactant’s dominance. More specif-
ically, at the beginning of the interaction, the virtual human would
express joy. Then the virtual human infers the interactant’s domi-
nance based on the interactant’s emotional reaction. If the interactant
is dominant, the virtual human would display empathetic emotions; if
the interactant is submissive, the virtual human would express anger.
The authors contrasted this virtual human with ones that only dis-
played joy, anger, or empathetic emotions. Participants judged this
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virtual human to be more persuasive than the ones that only displayed
joy or empathetic emotions, but not the one that only displayed anger.
Although Ochs and Prendinger (2010) suggested that dominance
should be taken into consideration, they did not explicitly examine
the role of power or dominance. In Study 2, we examined whether
power and perceived appropriateness moderate the e↵ect of emotional
expressions in persuasion, as seen in social science studies on negoti-
ation (Van Kleef & Coˆte´, 2007). We hypothesized that the e↵ect of
virtual humans’ emotional expressions is jointly determined by power
and perceived appropriateness. Using the same persuasion task from
Study 1, we tested Hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 2: The e↵ect of virtual humans’ facial emotional displays
on persuasion is jointly determined by power and perceived appropriate-
ness.
4.2 Design
Study 2 employed the same persuasion task (the Lunar Survival Task)
as Study 1. Details about this task can be found in section 2.3 on
page 69. A 2X2X2 between-subject factorial design was used; three
variables were independently manipulated: Virtual human’s emotional
expression: Emotional vs. Non-emotional; Participants’ power: Power-
ful vs. Powerless, and Perceived appropriateness of the virtual human’s
emotional expressions: Appropriate vs. Inappropriate.
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While facial images used in Study 1 were from the Cohn-Kanade
Facial Database (Kanade et al., 2000; Lucey et al., 2010), which con-
tained photographs of real human subjects (see Fig. 3.1), Study 2 used
computer-generated facial images. There are several reasons to use
computer-generated faces instead of photographs of real faces in Study
2. First, we wanted to see whether results from Study 1 (which are
based on real faces) can be replicated with computer-generated faces.
Second, virtual humans can take many forms including photorealistic
representations and non-photorealistic representations. To make our
findings applicable to a wide range of applications, it is important to
test our hypotheses not only with photorealistic representations, but
also with non-photorealistic representations.
Facial images of two female virtual humans in neutral, angry, and
happy expressions were generated using FaceGen1, as shown in Fig. 4.1.
The computer program randomly selected a virtual human for each
participant. Data analysis suggested that the dependent measure was
not a↵ected by which virtual human was selected, F (1, 1043) = .01, p =
.919(ns); see Table 4.1.
The computer program randomly assigned participants into one out
of eight conditions; the number of participants in each condition is
approximately the same (see Table 4.6 on page 109).
The same dependent measure from Study 1 - Change Score - was
1http://www.facegen.com/
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Figure 4.1: Study 2 Virtual humans
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Table 4.1: Study 2 Data by face
Dependent measure = Change Score
N Mean SD SE 95% CI for Mean
First virtual human 502 9.97 7.848 .350 (9.28, 10.66)
Second virtual human 542 9.92 7.566 .325 (9.28, 10.56)
Total 1044 9.94 7.699 .238 (9.47, 10.41)
used in Study 2. Persuasion was measured by calculating the amount
of changes the participants had made after receiving persuasive infor-
mation from the virtual human.
4.3 Method
4.3.1 Participants
A total of 1200 participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical
Turk. Participants who had participated in Study 1 were disqualified
from participating in Study 2. All participants resided in the United
States. There were 42.7% females, and the average age was 30.7 with
SD=10.01. Caucasians comprised 78.4% of the sample, whereas the
remainder consisted of Asians (8.5%), African Americans (7.5%), His-
panic Americans (5.0%), and Native Americans (0.6%). Sixty partici-
pants were removed because their response may not be valid (see sec-
tion 2.4 on page 71). Eighty-eight participants were excluded because
they failed a manipulation check (details are described in section 4.4.1
on page 101). Eight outliers were removed (e.g. their scores of the
dependent measure were greater than 3 SDs away from the mean). A
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total of 1044 data points were used for analysis.
4.3.2 Procedure and materials
Study 2 followed the same procedure as Study 1. Details of the proce-
dure can be found in section 3.3.2 on page 80. Emotional expressions
were manipulated the same way as in Study 1; participants under the
emotional condition interacted with a virtual human that displayed an-
gry/happy facial expressions depending on participants’ pre-rankings,
whereas participants under the non-emotional condition communicated
with a virtual human that remained neutral at all times.
To manipulate power, participants under the powerful condition
were instructed that they were the leader, whereas participants in the
powerless condition learned that they were the follower.
For the perceived appropriateness manipulation, we adopted a method
that was used in previous research (Adam et al., 2010). Participants in
the appropriate condition were given the following information:
“A recent study has found that most people express emotions, in-
cluding anger, in computer-mediated communication. The study fur-
ther indicated that it is widely acceptable to express emotions during
computer-mediated communication.”
In comparison, no such information was given in the inappropriate
condition. Therefore, the inappropriate condition was identical to that
in Study 1, and replicates the “Default anger” condition in Adam and
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colleagues’ experiment (Adam et al., 2010).
4.3.3 Dependent measure
The same dependent measure from Study 1 was used, i.e. Change
Score, to reflect the di↵erence between pre-rankings and post-rankings.
A higher score indicates more persuasion, whereas a lower score implies
less persuasion. For detailed description and an example of calculation,
please refer to section 3.3.3 on page 88.
4.4 Results and discussion
4.4.1 Manipulation check
At the end of the experiment, participants were asked to rate their
virtual teammate based on expressiveness on a scale from 1 to 11 (with 1
being extremely inexpressive and 11 being extremely expressive). Those
who interacted with an emotional virtual human rated their teammate
as more expressive (M=7.4, SD=2.31) than those who encountered a
non-emotional virtual human (M = 6.2, SD = 2.78; t(1042) = 7.58, p <
.001).
After receiving role assignment (and prior to interacting with the
virtual human), participants were asked to confirm their role (leader
or follower). A Chi-square test showed that responses were consistent
with assigned role,  2(1, N = 1044) = 965.53, p < .001, such that
98.2% of participants assigned as leaders responded correctly compared
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to 98.1% of participants who responded that were assigned to be a
follower. Participants who had confusions about their role (21 in total)
were excluded from data analysis.
For participants under the appropriate condition (i.e. they received
information that emotional expressions are appropriate), they were
asked “Is expressing emotions, including anger, appropriate in computer-
mediated communication?” 453 out of 520 (86.92%) participants an-
swered “Appropriate”. The rest (67 in total) were removed from data
analysis2. Thus, in total, 88 responses were excluded due to failed
manipulation.
Out of the 1044 participants analyzed, 183 (17.53%) did not make
any changes (by design, participants had to perform a task to maintain
their original rankings). A separate data analysis was performed while
excluding these participants; results can be found in Appendix A.2 on
page 152.
2There can be a di↵erence between what a participant was told and what he or she accepted.
For example, a participant could be told that “it is widely acceptable to express emotions” based
on social science studies, but still insisted that expressing emotions is unacceptable. Therefore, an
argument can be made against exclusion. However, on the other hand, we do not know whether these
participants answered unacceptable because they believed expressing emotions is unacceptable, or
because they did not read the instructions at all. In the latter case, their responses may not be
valid. We propose that these participants should be excluded to ensure the validity of the data.
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Figure 4.2: Study 2 Main e↵ect of Power
Error bars represent standard errors.
4.4.2 Main e↵ects
We found a main e↵ect of power on persuasion, F (1, 1042) = 25.66, p <
.001. As shown in Fig. 4.2 and Table 4.2, power was a significant predic-
tor on the outcome of persuasion; when assigned the role of a follower,
participants were persuaded more (Mean Change Score = 11.10, SD =
7.422) than when assigned the role of a leader (M = 8.71, SD = 7.805).
In short, powerful participants were less inclined to make changes.
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Table 4.2: Study 2 Powerful conditions vs. Powerless conditions
Dependent measure = Change Score
N Mean SD SE 95% Confidence Interval for Mean
Participant
is leader
505 8.71 7.805 .347 (8.03, 9.39)
Participant
is follower
539 11.10 7.422 .320 (10.47, 11.73)
Total 1044 9.94 7.699 .238 (9.48, 10.41)
In Van Kleef’s negotiation study (Van Kleef et al., 2006), a main
e↵ect of power was also observed. Similarly, participants with high
power were less inclined to make concessions.
The main e↵ect of emotional expressions observed in Study 1 (where
all participants were leaders) was absent in Study 2 (where half of
the participants were leaders, and half were followers), F (1, 1042) =
1.42, p = .233(ns). This suggests that the e↵ect of emotional expres-
sions may be moderated by power.
In Study 1, all participants played the role of a leader, and there were
no instructions on whether emotional expressions were appropriate.
This corresponds to the powerful, inappropriate conditions in Study
2. These conditions yielded an e↵ect that was similar to that in Study
1: A subservient virtual human’s emotional expressions reduced per-
suasion, F(1, 271)=7.60, p=.006. An emotional virtual human achieved
less persuasion (Mean Change Score = 7.402, SD=7.217) than a non-
emotional one (M=9.97, SD=8.16), see Table 4.3. Thus, findings in
Study 1 (A subservient virtual human’s emotional expressions reduce
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persuasion) were replicated in Study 2 .
Table 4.3: Study 2 Powerful, Inappropriate conditions (i.e. conditions replicating
Study 1)
Dependent measure = Change Score
N Mean SD SE 95% Confidence Interval for Mean
Non-emotional 129 9.97 8.163 .719 (8.55, 11.39)
Emotional 144 7.40 7.217 .601 (6.21, 8.59)
Total 273 8.61 7.771 .470 (7.69, 9.54)
4.4.3 Interaction e↵ects
We performed a 2X2X2 ANOVA test, but did not find a significant
three-way interaction, F (1, 1035) = .04, p = .838(ns). Therefore, there
is no evidence to suggest that all three factors jointly determine behav-
ior in persuasion.
Instead, we observed two two-way interactions: Emotional expres-
sions interacted with power; independently, emotional expressions in-
teracted with perceived appropriateness. In other words, power and
perceived appropriateness independently moderated the e↵ect of emo-
tional expressions. These two moderators are described in detail below.
Fig. 4.3 visualizes the two-way interaction between emotional ex-
pression and power, F(1,1040) = 4.54, p = .033. When participants
were playing the role of a leader (left of the figure), their behavior
di↵ered when the subservient virtual human expressed versus not ex-
pressed emotions, F(1,503) = 4.78, p = .029. Participants were less
persuaded when the virtual human displayed emotions (Mean Change
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Figure 4.3: Study 2 Emotional Expression X Power interaction
Error bars represent standard errors.
Score = 7.99, SD = 7.648) than when the virtual human did not express
emotions (M = 9.50, SD = 7.913). Results are summarized in Table 4.4.
On the other hand, when participants were playing the role of a fol-
lower, there was no e↵ect (right of the figure). In summary, emotional
expressions reduced persuasion only when observed by leaders.
Therefore, virtual humans’ emotional expressions backfired in Study
1 because participants played the role of a leader. When participants
were no long in power, the backfire e↵ect went away (Study 2). To fur-
ther determine whether emotional expression backfired because leaders
considered these emotional expressions to be inappropriate, we looked
at the second inteaction e↵ect.
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Table 4.4: Study 2 Emotional Expression X Power conditions
Dependent measure = Change Score
N Mean SD SE 95% CI for Mean
Powerless, Non-emotional 278 10.86 7.323 .456 (9.97, 11.75)
Powerless, Emotional 261 11.35 7.531 .470 (10.43, 12.27)
Powerful, Non-emotional 241 9.50 7.913 .489 (8.54, 10.46)
Powerful, Emotional 264 7.99 7.648 .468 (7.07, 8.91)
Fig. 4.4 demonstrates the two-way interaction between emotional
expressions and perceived appropriateness, F(1, 1040) = 4.71, p =
.030. When considered inappropriate (Fig. 4.4, left), a virtual human’s
emotional expressions reduced persuasion, F(1,1040) = 5.60, p = .018.
An emotional virtual human achieved less persuasion (Mean Change
Score = 8.97, SD = 7.660) than a non-emotional virtual human (M
= 10.52, SD = 7.579). In constrast, when perceived as appropriate
(Fig. 4.4, right), emotional expressions did not seem to have an e↵ect.
In summary, only inappropriate emotional expressions reduced persua-
sion; once manipulated to be appropriate, emotional expressions do not
seem to have an e↵ect.
Table 4.5: Study 2 Emotional Expression X Appropriateness conditions
Dependent measure = Change Score
N Mean SD SE 95% Cl for Mean
Inappropriate, Non-emotional 275 10.52 7.579 .463 (9.61, 11.43)
Inappropriate, Emotional 274 8.97 7.660 .464 (8.06, 9.88)
Appropriate, Non-emotional 244 9.90 7.680 .492 (8.93, 10.86)
Appropriate, Emotional 251 10.41 7.829 .485 (9.46, 11.36)
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Figure 4.4: Study 2 Emotional Expression x Appropriateness interaction
Error bars represent standard errors.
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Given that participants’ power could reduce persuasion, whereas in-
appropriateness can also reduce persuasion, what happens when par-
ticipants are in power and the emotional expressions are perceived as
inappropriate? These e↵ects of power and inappropriateness are in-
dependent but may be additive. Therefore, while the hypothesized
three-way interaction was not significant, we performed a contrast test
comparing the particular cell where participants were in power and
the emotional expressions were perceived inappropriate with the other
cells. We observed less perusaion in that particular cell than other cells,
t(1036) = 4.23, p < .001; Table 4.6.
Table 4.6: Study 2 Contrasting the Powerful, Inappropriate cell (marked in bold)
with other cells
Dependent measure = Change Score
Cell N Mean SD SE 95% Cl
Powerless, Inappropriate, Non-emotional 146 11.01 7.014 .628 (9.78, 12.25)
Powerless, Inappropriate, Emotional 130 10.71 7.788 .666 (9.40, 12.02)
Powerless, Appropriate, Non-emotional 132 10.69 7.673 .661 (9.39, 11.99)
Powerless, Appropriate, Emotional 131 11.99 7.241 .663 (10.69, 13.29)
Powerful, Inappropriate, Non-emotional 129 9.97 8.163 .669 (8.66, 11.28)
Powerful, Inappropriate, Emotional 144 7.40 7.217 .633 (6.16, 8.64)
Powerful, Appropriate, Non-emotional 112 8.96 7.617 .717 (7.56, 10.37)
Powerful, Appropriate, Emotional 120 8.69 8.109 .693 (7.33, 10.05)
We conducted a second contrast test comparing the same cell with
the other cells under the powerful condition (i.e., participants were
leaders; italicized cells in Table 4.6). Again, there was less perusaion
in that particular cell, t(501) = 2.36, p = .019. Therefore, the e↵ects of
power and inappropriateness were independent but additive.
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In summary, Study 1 and Study 2 suggested that a subservient vir-
tual human’s emotional display may be considered inappropriate by a
leader, and may reduce persuasion. If the leader becomes a follower,
this e↵ect disappears. Alternately, if the leader considers the emo-
tional expressions to be appropriate, this e↵ect also goes away. In
short, power and perceived appropriateness independently moderate
the e↵ect of virtual humans’ emotional expressions; emotional expres-
sions reduce persuasion only when considered inappropriate and/or are
observed by leaders.
The discovery that power moderates the e↵ect of emotional expres-
sions in persuasion echoes Ochs and colleagues’ theory that users’ dom-
inance plays a role in persuasion (Ochs & Prendinger, 2010). Given
that most existing studies in human-virtual human interactions have
not considered power or dominance, it may help explain why existing
findings have been inconclusive. Future studies need to take into con-
sideration power and dominance when studying the e↵ect of emotional
expressions in persuasion.
In addition, power has a main e↵ect on persuasion; powerful people
are resistant to changes. Presenting persuasive information to powerful
people poses a great challenge: they may not listen, and if they judge
the persuader’s emotional expressions to be inappropriate, they will
retaliate.
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The backfire e↵ect observed in Study 2 was similar to that in negoti-
ation (Van Kleef & Coˆte´, 2007) but had a di↵erent pattern. In negotia-
tion, recipients retaliated when they were powerful and they considered
anger expressions to be inappropriate. Whereas in our persuasion task,
recipients retaliated when they are powerful or they considered the
emotional expressions to be inappropriate. We speculate that such a
di↵erence is likely due to the di↵erent nature of the two tasks.
In the study conducted by (Van Kleef & Coˆte´, 2007), the task was
competitive; there was a conflict of interest (i.e., to demand more value
from the other party). Whereas in the present study, the task was coop-
erative; the parties’ goals were cooperatively linked (i.e., to survive as
a team). This distinction can be crucial, as Van Kleef et al. (2014) in-
dicated that the competitive versus cooperative nature of the situation
would fundamentally change the meaning and social consequences of
emotional expressions. Specifically, strategic inferences may determine
behavior when the situation is competitive, and a↵ective reactions can
become more predictive of behavior when the situation is cooperative.
Therefore, in Van Kleef and colleague’s competitive tasks, partici-
pants may have engaged in deeper information processing, as they had
a higher need to understand their competitor’s behavior. Therefore,
they needed to examine both power and appropriateness before they
could make a decision. In comparison, in our cooperative task, par-
ticipants may have acted in a more automatic way, as there was lower
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need to understand a collaborator’s behavior. Therefore, as soon as
they observed either cue - power or appropriateness - they used it to
guide their decisions.
In conclusion, Study 2 demonstrated that in the context of persua-
sion, a virtual humans’ emotional expressions backfire when the human
interactant is powerful, and/or when the human interactant considers
emotional expressions to be inappropriate. Virtual humans’ emotional
expressions either backfired, or had no e↵ect. It is still unclear whether
virtual humans can use emotional expressions to aid persuasion. Fu-
ture studies need to more carefully examine whether (and how) virtual
humans can use emotional expressions to help perusaion.
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Chapter 5
Study 3: Photorealism and Emo-
tional Display
Unlike in human-human interactions, e↵ects of emotional expressions
in human-virtual human interactions may further depend on how the
virtual human is rendered. How a virtual human is presented may
a↵ect the delivery of emotional information, and subsequently the social
consequences of the emotional information.
Study 3 investigated whether photorealism impacts the perception
of emotional expressions and has an e↵ect on persuasion. Using the
same persuasion task as Study 1 and 2, Study 3 compared ratings of
emotional expressions and the persuasiveness of a photorealistic vir-
tual human versus a non-photorealistic one. In Study 3, both virtual
humans displayed emotions including happiness and anger, and all par-
ticipants played the role of a leader. Hypothesis 3 was tested:
Hypothesis 3: A photorealistic emotional virtual human is more per-
suasive than a non-photorealistic emotional virtual human.
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5.1 Literature review
According to Ferwerda (2003), an image is a visual representation of
a scene, in that it “re-presents” selected properties of the scene to the
viewer with varying degrees of realism. To measure image realism, three
standards of realism needs to be considered, namely:
Physical realism - in which the image provides the same visual stim-
ulation as the scene. This requires accurate descriptions, rendering,
and displays of the shape, materials, and illumination properties of the
scene.
Photorealism - in which the image produces the same visual response
as the scene, i.e., the image must be photo-metrically realistic, whereas
photometry is the measure of the eye’s response to light energy.
Functional realism - in which the image provides the same visual
information as the scene. This standard defines realism in terms of the
fidelity of the information the image provides. For instance, if an image
lets us do the task we need to do, and allows us to perform the task
as well as we could in the real world, then for that task, the image is
realistic.
In this study, we adopted the definition by Ferwerda (2003), i.e., an
image is photorealistic if it produces the same visual response as the
scene to the eye.
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While a number of groups have focused on synthesizing realistic im-
ages (e.g. Alexander et al., 2010), others have questioned both the need
for and the value of realism in many graphics applications (Ferwerda,
2003). For example, one question to our particular interest is: in a task
where the goal is to persuade, if a non-photorealistic virtual human can
be as persuasive as a photorealistic virtual human, is it still worthy to
produce a realistic virtual human?
In Study 3, we investigated whether a photorealistic emotional vir-
tual human is more persuasive than a non-photorealistic emotional vir-
tual human.
Previously, Zanbaka et al. (2006) have compared persuasiveness be-
tween di↵erent non-emotional virtual humans rendered in di↵erent re-
alism levels. The authors measured participants’ attitude change after
receiving persuasive information regarding university-wide comprehen-
sive exams. Attitude was measured using self-report questionnaires.
Real humans and virtual characters acted as the speaker. The speakers
did not express emotions during persuasion. The authors reported that
virtual speakers can be as e↵ective at changing attitudes as real people.
Using a behavioral measure, Wang et al. (2013) examined e↵ects of
photorealism when non-emotional virtual humans attempted to per-
suade participants, however they did not find an e↵ect of photore-
alism. Therefore, even when behavioral measures are used, a non-
photorealistic virtual human can be as persuasive as a photorealistic
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virtual human.
On the other hand, in the meta-analysis conducted by Yee et al.
(2007), it was noted that non-emotional virtual humans with higher
photorealism produced more positive social interactions than represen-
tations with lower photorealism, although this e↵ect was only found
when subjective measures were used.
Virtual humans in the above studies did not express emotions. What
happens when they express emotions?
In Study 3 we examined the e↵ect of photorealism when virtual hu-
mans express emotions. We manipulated photorealism more carefully
by creating photorealistic and non-photorealistic versions of the same
virtual human (Fig. 5.1). Our goal was to manipulate photorealism
while holding all other factors constant.
We hypothesized that a photorealistic emotional virtual human is
more persuasive than one that is non-photorealistic. This prediction
was derived from the Revised Ethopoeia Concept (Nass & Moon, 2000;
Von der Puetten, Kra¨mer, Gratch, & Kang, 2010), which suggests that
certain characteristics of computers facilitate mindless social reactions,
and that the more computers present characteristics that are associated
with humans, the more likely they are to elicit social behavior (Nass
& Moon, 2000). As Von der Puetten et al. (2010) put it, it does not
matter whether participants are interacting with an agent or an avatar,
but rather how many human-like characteristics the systems provides.
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Figure 5.1: Study 3 Virtual humans
Upper row: Non-photorealistic version; Lower row: Photorealistic version.
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Although every system elicits social reactions as long as the system
provides social cues (Ethopoeia Concept), a system will elicit more or
stronger social reactions when it provides more social cues (Revised
Ethopoeia Concept). Therefore, a photorealistic virtual human’s emo-
tional expressions may elicit more response than a non-photorealistic
virtual human’s emotional expressions.
Hypothesis 3: A photorealistic emotional virtual human is more per-
suasive than a non-photorealistic emotional virtual human.
5.2 Design
Study 3 used the same persuasion task (the Lunar Survival Task) as
the previous two studies. Details about this task can be found in sec-
tion 2.3 on page 69. All participants played the role of the leader,
and both virtual humans expressed emotions including happiness and
anger following the Carro. There were no instructions regarding the
appropriateness of emotional expressions. Thus, Study 3 corresponded
to the Emotional condition in Study 1, and the Emotional, Powerful,
Inappropriate condition in Study 2.
Two versions of the same virtual human were used: a photorealistic
one, and a non-photorealistic one (Fig. 5.1, page 117). Photorealis-
tic images of the virtual human was derived from the Cohn-Kanade
Facial Database (Kanade et al., 2000; Lucey et al., 2010), as this
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database provides reliably labeled happy and angry facial images. Non-
photorealistic images were created in such a way that all facial contours
aligned with those from the photorealistic version.
Participants under the photorealistic condition interacted with the
photorealistic virtual human, whereas participants under the non-photorealistic
condition interacted with the non-photorealistic virtual human.
Similar to Study 1 and 2, the outcome of persuasion was measured
by calculating the amount of changes the participants had made after
receiving persuasive information from the virtual human.
5.3 Image Ratings
All images were prerated based on photorealism, happiness, and anger.
The prerate study on one hand served as a manipulation check on
photorealism, while on the other hand tested whether photorealism
has an e↵ect on the perception of emotional expressions.
One hundred participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical
Turk to rate the facial images. These participants did not participant in
the main study. The sample had an average age of 34.8 with SD=12.83.
Females consisted of 55.2% of the sample, and there were 72.2% Cau-
casians, 12.0% African Americans, 9.6% Asians, 4.2% Hispanics, and
2.0% Native Americans.
Each participant rated all six images (Fig. 5.1). Participants were
asked to provide ratings based on a number of descriptors, including:
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Photorealistic
Angry
Disgusted
Happy
Sad
Scared
Surprised
Normal
Natural
Genuine
These descriptors were related to photorealism, the six basic emo-
tions (Ekman, 1973), and the Uncanny Valley (Mori et al., 2012). Par-
ticipants provided ratings on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being “Strongly
disagree”, and 5 being “Strongly agree”. The order of the descriptors
was shu✏ed for each participant.
Results indicated that the manipulation on photorealism was suc-
cessful; the photorealistic facial images were perceived to be more pho-
torealistic in all three emotions (Fig. 5.2). For happiness expression, the
non-photorealistic facial image was rated 2.2 out of 5 (on a scale of 1 to
5, with 5 indicating very photorealistic) with SD=1.38, compared to 4.6
(SD=.81) for the photorealistic facial image, t(198) = 15.00, p < .001.
For anger expression, the non-photorealistic facial image was rated 2.3
(SD=1.42), compared to 4.2 (SD=1.12) for the photorealistic facial
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Figure 5.2: Study 3 Photorealism ratings
Photorealistic facial image were perceived to be more photorealistic in all emotions. Error bars
represent standard errors.
image, t(198) = 10.51, p < .001. For neutral expression, the non-
photorealistic facial image was rated 2.2 (SD=1.41), compared to 4.1
(SD=1.40) for the photorealistic facial image, t(198) = 9.56, p < .001.
Happy and anger expressions were also e↵ectively conveyed. Happy
faces achieved high happiness ratings, whereas angry faces achieved
high anger ratings, in both the photorealistic condition and the non-
photorealistic conditions. The non-photorealistic happy face had a
happiness rating of 4.6 (out of 5) with SD=.73, and the photoreal-
istic happy face achieved a happiness rating of 4.7, with SD=.72. The
non-photorealistic angry face had an anger rating of 3.3 (out of 5) with
SD=1.27, and the photorealistic angry face had an anger rating of 3.8,
with SD=1.18.
Photorealism has an e↵ect on the perception of negative emotions.
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Figure 5.3: Study 3 Anger ratings
Anger was perceived stronger in the photorealistic condition. Error bars represent standard errors.
Anger, disgust, and fear were perceived stronger in the photorealis-
tic condition, whereas perceptions of happiness and surprise did not
di↵er across conditions. For example, as shown in Fig. 5.3 the photore-
alistic angry face was rated as more angry (M=3.8, SD=1.18) than
the non-photorealistic angry face (M = 3.3, SD = 1.27), t(198) =
2.88, p = .004. But ratings of happiness for the photorealistic face
(M=4.7, SD=.72) and the non-photorealistic one (M=4.6, SD=.73) did
not significantly di↵er, t(198) = .98, p = .331(ns). This suggests that
participants under the photorealistic condition may have received more
emotional information, especially anger.
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5.4 Method
5.4.1 Participants
A total of 127 participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical
Turk to take part in the main study (participants who took part in
any of the previous studies were disqualified). All participants resided
in the United States. There were 46.2% females, and the average age
was 32.7 (SD=10.57). Caucasians comprised the majority of the sam-
ple (76.4%), whereas the remainder consisted of Asians (9.2%), African
Americans (8.4%), Hispanic Americans (5.9%), and Native Americans
(0.1%). Eight participants were removed from data analysis because
their responses may be invalid (for more details see section 2.4 on
page 71). Finally, 119 data points remained for analysis1.
5.4.2 Procedure and materials
Study 3 followed the same procedure as Study 1 and 2. Details of the
procedure can be found in section 3.3.2 on page 80. Participants under
the photorealistic condition interacted with a photorealistic emotional
virtual human, and participants under the non-photorealistic condition
communicated with a non-photorealistic emotional virtual human.
The same dependent measure from Study 1 was used, i.e. Change
Score, to reflect the di↵erence between pre-rankings and post-rankings.
1Ten participants did not make any changes. Results after excluding these participants are
reported in Appendix A.3 on page 154.
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A higher score indicates more persuasion, whereas a lower score implies
less persuasion. For detailed description and an example of calculation,
please refer to section 3.3.3 on page 88.
5.5 Results and discussion
5.5.1 E↵ects of photorealism
Photorealism did not have a main e↵ect on persuasion, F (117) =
.17, p = .680(ns); see Table 5.1. Therefore there is no evidence to sup-
port Hypothesis 3: A photorealistic emotional virtual human is more
persuasive than a non-photorealistic one.
This finding may lend support to the TMSI, which states that photo-
realism should have minimum e↵ect on virtual humans’ social influence
unless it impacts behavioral realism.
Table 5.1: Study 3 results
Dependent measure = Change Score
N Mean SD SE 95% Confidence Interval for Mean
Nonphotorealistic 59 8.06 5.310 .691 (6.68, 9.45)
Photorealistic 60 8.47 5.670 .732 (7.01, 9.94)
Total 119 8.27 5.475 .502 (7.28, 9.27)
5.5.2 E↵ects of emotional information
If a participant saw more angry/happy faces, was the participant more
persuaded?
The computer program recorded statistics including the number
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of (unique) questions asked2, number of angry/happy faces seen, etc.
Based on this information, each participant saw an average of 5.2 emo-
tional expressions (including both angry and happy facial expressions)
with min=1, max=16, SD=3.25. More specifically, each participant
saw an average of 2.2 angry faces (min=0, max=10, SD=1.97) and 2.9
happy faces (min=0, max=12, SD=2.23).
We performed a multiple regression analysis to examine whether the
number of angry faces and the number of happy faces were predic-
tors. Results indicated these two variables significantly predicted the
dependent measure (Change Score), F (2, 116) = 16.76, p < .01, R2 =
.224, R2Adjusted = .211. On the other hand, only the number of an-
gry faces seen predicted persuasion (  = .43, t(116) = 5.17, p < .01),
while the number of happy faces seen did not predict persuasion (  =
.13, t(116) = 1.57, p = .119, ns).
It is possible that a participant saw more angry faces simply because
he or she asked more questions. And when a participant asked more
(unique) questions, he gained more information. Therefore, the number
of unique questions asked (min=3, max=15, mean=6.7, SD=4.27) may
be a predictor. It is also plausible that a participant saw more angry
faces because he saw more emotional expressions overall. Hence, the
number of emotional faces seen could also predict persuasion.
We performed a second multiple regression analysis to test whether
2Participants were allowed to ask duplicate questions.
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the number of angry faces seen, the number of emotional faces seen, and
the number of unique questions asked predicted persuasion. Results
indicated these variables predicted the dependent measure (Change
Score), F (3, 115) = 11.21, p < .01, R2 = .226, R2Adjusted = .206. How-
ever, only the number of angry faces seen was a predictor (  = .30, t(115) =
2.40, p = .02), while the number of emotional faces seen was not (  =
.09, t(115) = .44, p = .66, ns). The number of unique questions asked
was not a predictor either (  = .12, t(115) = .55, p = .59, ns).
These findings demonstrate that participants were a↵ected by the
amount of anger expressions they saw, instead of the amount of cog-
nitive information they received (reflected by the number of questions
asked). It is likely that participants did not engage in deep cognitive
thinking in Study 3, therefore the amount of cognitive information did
not matter. According to the EASI model, people in cooperative tasks
may find their actions better explained by a↵ective reactions than in-
ference processes. This may explain why participants who saw more
angry faces were more a↵ected.
On the other hand, it is interesting that although the amount of
anger expressions predicted persuasion, photorealism - a factor that
impacted the perception of anger expressions - did not seem to have an
impact on persuasion. One plausible explanation is that the impact of
photorealism on emotion perception is not strong enough to regulate
social e↵ects. The impact of adding one more angry facial expression
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may have surpassed the impact of displaying anger photorealistically
instead of non-photorealistically. Future studies need to more carefully
study the e↵ects of emotional expressions by photorealistic virtual hu-
mans versus non-photorealistic virtual humans.
In conclusion, Study 3 demonstrated that on one hand, photorealism
enhanced the perception of negative emotions such as anger, disgust,
and fear, while on the other hand, a photorealistic emotional virtual
human was not necessarily more persuasive than a non-photorealistic
one. The number of angry faces seen predicted persuasion, whereas the
number of happy faces seen, the number of total emotional faces seen,
or the number of unique questions asked did not predict persuasion.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
6.1 Discussion
In the context of persuasion, we explored the e↵ect of virtual hu-
mans’ facial emotional displays including happiness and anger. Study 1
showed that a subservient virtual human’s emotional expressions under-
mined persuasion. Study 2 revealed that the e↵ect of virtual humans’
emotional expressions was jointly determined by power and perceived
appropriateness of the emotional expressions. A virtual human’s emo-
tional expressions reduced persuasion when recipients were powerful,
and/or when the emotional expressions were considered inappropriate.
When both conditions were satisfied, emotional expressions reduced
persuasion the most; when neither condition was met, emotional ex-
pressions appeared irrelevant. Study 3 suggested that photorealism,
while having some impact on the perception of anger expressions, did
not moderate the e↵ect of emotional expressions. The number of angry
faces seen by the participants predicted the outcome of persuasion.
Power had a strong main e↵ect on persuasion. Powerful participants
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were resistant to changes when compared with powerless participants
(Study 2, Fig. 4.2). In Van Kleef’s negotiation study (Van Kleef et al.,
2006), power also had a strong main e↵ect. In their experiment, par-
ticipants with high power were less inclined to make concessions. This
demonstrates that it is hard to persuade powerful people, and raises in-
teresting questions such as what is a good strategy to present persuasive
information to powerful people. As seen in our studies, if information
is presented with inappropriate behavior such as inappropriate emo-
tional expressions, powerful people may reject the information, even
though the information is valuable (in our experiments, powerless vir-
tual humans o↵ered NASA’s expert ratings to powerful participants).
Therefore, people should be very careful with their behavior when pre-
senting information to powerful people, as inappropriate behavior can
undermine the delivery of valuable information.
Power also moderates the e↵ect of emotional expressions in per-
suasion. In our study, when virtual humans tried to use emotional
expressions to help persuade leaders, these emotional expressions back-
fired. On the other hand, when virtual humans tried to use emotional
expressions to persuade followers, these emotional expressions did not
backfire. Previous studies on perusaion have not reported that emo-
tional expressions could backfire, and there may be several reasons.
First, we contrasted the expression of emotions with no expression,
whereas literature has mainly focused on comparing one emotion with
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another, e.g. anger vs. happiness (Van Kleef et al., 2014). Second,
there is a distinction between emotions that are expressed toward an
object, an attitude, and a person. In previous persuasion studies con-
ducted by Van Kleef et al. (2014), emotions were expressed toward
objects and attitudes. For example, in their first study, a represen-
tative expressed sadness/happiness concerning removing bobsleighing
from the Olympics. In this case, emotional expressions provided cog-
nitive information; “I am sad that bobsleighing may be removed from
the Olympics” may be the equivalent of saying “I do not want bob-
sleighing to be removed from the Olympics”. On the other hand, emo-
tional expressions targeted at recipient’s attitudes (e.g. “It’s ridicu-
lous”) provide information on what the expresser thinks of the recipi-
ent’s attitudes. However, this does not mean that the expresser thinks
the recipient is ridiculous. An individual can like another person, yet
thinks the person’s opinion is ridiculous (“I like you, but your opinion
is ridiculous”). This distinction can be crucial, as “Your opinion is
ridiculous” may not be taken personally, whereas “You are ridiculous”
may be taken personally and cause retaliation. There is a possibility
that anger expressions in our study backfired because they were tar-
geted at the recipients. Would anger expressions targeted at a person
always backfire? Would results be di↵erent if the virtual humans had
expressed anger toward the participants’ rankings (e.g. “Your rank-
ing makes me angry”)? These questions are worth exploring in future
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studies.
While our study showed that emotional expressions either backfired
or had no e↵ect, this is not to say that emotional expressions will not
help. First of all, our study was conducted in the context of persuasion,
therefore results may only mean that emotional expressions might not
help persuasion. A smile may not help persuasion, but may help in
creating good impressions and establishing connections. Second, the
present study examined e↵ects of happiness and anger expressions/the
Carrot-and-Stick strategy. While results showed that these emotional
expressions did not help persuasion, other emotional expressions may
help, e.g. empathetic emotions (Ochs & Prendinger, 2010). Sadness
may help as well; for example, if a person is pulled over by a police
o cer, and he wants to convince the o cer that he had an emergency,
instead of expressing happiness and/or anger, he may express sadness
while saying “Sorry o cer, I really had an emergency”. Future studies
need to explore whether emotional expressions other than happiness
and anger can aid persuasion.
Building on the work by Ochs and Prendinger (2010), one strategy
to use emotional expressions in persuasion may be:
1. Examine the competitive vs. cooperative nature of the task. If the
task is competitive, anger may be expressed to intimidate. If the
task is cooperative, expressing emotions to intimidate may not be
as e↵ective.
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2. Examine whether the recipients are su ciently motivated and able
to process emotional information. If they are not (due to low
epistemic motivation or high cognitive load), emotional expressions
may not be e↵ective.
3. Be aware of all the social rules in the current context, and make
sure there would not be any inappropriate behavior.
4. If the persuasive message can be matched with a emotion, express
that emotion.
5. Examine social power and/or dominance of the recipient in the
current context. If the recipient is powerless/submissive, express
anger to intimidate. Otherwise, express empathetic emotions.
This study provides several real world implications. First, power-
less individuals should understand that emotional expressions are not
irrelevant during persuasion (Van Kleef et al., 2014), and that they
are not expected to express emotions to powerful individuals (Tiedens
& Fragale, 2003). Emotional expressions may be strategically used to
gain benefits, but probably not for powerless individuals. Consider the
case where a child yells angrily to get his or her way with the parents.
Unfortunately, such behavior is more likely to trigger retaliation from
the parents, instead of compromises. However, if it is the parents who
yell at the child, these emotional expressions can be e↵ective in mak-
ing the child to behave. Imagine another scenario where an employee
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presents information to his or her boss. If the employee shows a lot of
emotions, the boss may think he or she is biased, emotionally unstable,
trying to be in charge, or manipulative. Likely, the boss will reject
the employee’s information. Now, assume the boss is expressing a lot
of emotions. These emotional expressions are likely to help, regardless
of being positive or negative - if the boss is happy, the employee may
feel encouraged; if the boss is angry, the employee may feel pressured
to oblige. In summary, powerless people should be very careful with
showing emotions to powerful individuals.
On the other hand, powerful individuals need to be aware that his or
her information processing is (unconsciously) a↵ected by others’ emo-
tional expressions. Our experiments showed that powerful recipients re-
jected valuable information when the persuader appeared emotional. In
other words, emotional expressions undermined the delivery of valuable
messages. If an individual is presenting valuable information, powerful
individuals should not let the presenter’s emotional expressions inter-
fere with information provision.
Our study showed that it is possible to tweak a social rule to re-
duce the negative consequences of violating the social rule. For exam-
ple, expressing anger is considered inappropriate (Adam et al., 2010),
and violating this rule can cause negative e↵ects (Adam et al., 2010;
Van Kleef & Coˆte´, 2007). However, by telling the participants that “It
is acceptable to express emotions including anger”, the negative e↵ects
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associated with this violation disappeared (Study 2; see also Van Kleef
& Coˆte´, 2007). Therefore, when it is inevitable to violate a social rule,
one may think whether it is possible to tweak that social rule to reduce
the negative e↵ects. However, presumably only weak social beliefs can
be tweaked (e.g. whether it is appropriate to express anger). Strong
social beliefs (e.g. whether it is appropriate to lie) are unlikely to be
tweaked.
6.2 Contributions
Tremendous attention has been focused on the study of attitude change
and persuasion (Petty et al., 1997, 2003; DeSteno et al., 2004; Petty,
2013; Van Kleef et al., 2014; Petty & Brin˜ol, 2015). Developing strate-
gies for persuasion and designing persuasive virtual humans have many
applications in advertising, education, counseling, therapy, gaming, and
so on.
However, social scientists pointed out that there is a lack of fo-
cus on the interpersonal e↵ects of emotional expressions in persuasion
(Van Kleef et al., 2014). Meanwhile, computer scientists reported con-
tradictory findings regarding virtual humans’ emotional expressions.
In the context of persuasion, existing findings have been mixed: On
one hand, Berry et al. (2005) demonstrated that presenting informa-
tion via an emotional virtual human did not help persuasion. On the
other hand, Koster (2006) and Ochs and Prendinger (2010) showed
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that it is possible for virtual humans to strategically display emotions
to facilitate persuasion. The present study demonstrated that a virtual
human’s emotional expressions including anger and happiness did not
help persuasion; rather, they backfired. Findings from this study shed
light onto the mixed findings regarding persuasive virtual humans, and
contribute to the development of more accurate models in explaining
e↵ects in virtual worlds.
Existing studies on virtual humans’ emotional displays in persuasion
have not examined moderators. We are among the first to look at the
e↵ects of emotional expressions jointly with power and perceived ap-
propriateness. Findings from this study demonstrated that power and
perceived appropriateness are two moderators on the e↵ect of emotional
expressions. This may help explain why existing studies on virtual hu-
mans’ emotional expressions have been inconclusive - power moderates
the e↵ect of emotional expressions, however most studies did not take
power into consideration (they did not examine the power relationship
between the expresser and the observer). Future studies need to take
into account potential moderators when studying the e↵ect of virtual
humans’ emotional expressions.
Moreover, existing studies on attitude change and persuasion have
mainly focused on subjective measures such as ratings of virtual hu-
mans’ persuasiveness (Berry et al., 2005; Ochs & Prendinger, 2010) or
self-report memory of the persuasive messages (Berry et al., 2005). Very
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limited studies on persuasion have used behavioral measures, especially
in human-virtual human interactions. The present study employed a
behavioral measure in studying persuasion. This study adds to the lim-
ited body of literature that analyzes behavior in persuasion. Findings
from this study will be valuable to applications that aim at changing
behavior as the final goal.
Following the work by de Melo et al. (2011a) who replicated findings
from human-human interactions in human-virtual human interactions,
this study replicated the backfire e↵ect found in human-human nego-
tiations. This stresses that virtual humans’ emotional expressions can
elicit responses that are similar to real humans’ emotional expressions.
We hope to inspire more collaboration between social scientists and
computer scientists for studying the e↵ects of emotional expressions.
6.3 Limitations
This study may have several limitations:
First, findings in this study are based on a dyad persuasion task
where the two parties’ goals are cooperatively linked. Findings from
this study do not necessarily generalize to other tasks. Particularly, if
the cooperative nature of the task has been changed, e↵ects may be
very di↵erent.
Second, in the present study, emotions were expressed via virtual
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humans’ facial expressions, and virtual humans were rendered as screen-
based head-only representations. Our results may or may not apply
to systems where virtual humans express emotions via other channels
and/or are rendered di↵erently.
Third, Study 2 and 3 used female virtual humans only. Gender dif-
ferences were not examined in this study. While there is no evidence
to suggest that virtual humans’ gender would significantly impact the
social consequences of his or her emotional expressions, some studies
have shown that people may have preferences for virtual humans’ gen-
der (Zanbaka et al., 2006; Guadagno et al., 2007).
6.4 Future work
There are a number of future directions to be pursued.
First, this study adopted a persuasion task where the parties’ goals
were cooperatively linked. We are eager to see more studies in both
cooperative and competitive persuasion tasks, as this will contribute to
a better understanding on the e↵ects of emotional expressions in the
context of persuasion. Particularly, we are interested to see whether
virtual humans will be able to use anger expressions to their advantage
in a competitive persuasion task.
Second, to manipulate power, participants in our experiments played
the role of a leader/follower. More power relationships can be explored,
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e.g. boss-employee relationships, teacher-student relationships, parent-
child relationship, etc.
Third, this study did not examine gender di↵erences. It is still un-
clear whether a virtual human’s gender would impact the delivery and
social consequences of his or her emotional expressions. Furthermore,
there exist debates on whether people prefer virtual humans from the
same gender (Guadagno et al., 2007), or the opposite gender (Zanbaka
et al., 2006). Future work can examine the role of gender.
Fourth, we contrasted expressions of happiness and anger with no
expression. Future studies can contrast happiness with no emotion,
anger with no emotion, happiness with anger, happiness with sadness,
and so on.
Fifth, in this study emotional expressions were targeted at the re-
cipients. Future studies can compare the di↵erences and similarities
between emotional expressions targeted at an object, at an attitude,
and at a person.
Sixth, the manipulation on appropriateness can be extended. We
compared two levels of appropriateness: appropriate instruction ver-
sus lack of instruction. Adam et al. (2010) introduced three levels of
appropriateness: appropriate instruction, lack of instruction, and in-
appropriate instruction. Future experiments can add a third condition
where emotional expressions are instructed as inappropriate.
Seventh, in the context of negotiation, Adam et al. (2010) suggested
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that people from di↵erent cultures may perceive anger expressions dif-
ferently and respond di↵erently. Future studies can investigate whether
this e↵ect can be replicated in the context of persuasion with virtual
humans.
Finally, it would be interesting to observe participants’ responses
when they are o↵ered di↵erent incentives. In the present study, partic-
ipants were o↵ered $0.50 to complete a 15-minute task. This resulted
in an hourly wage of $1.50, which is superior to the median reservation
wage of $1.38 as reported by Horton and Chilton (2010). On the other
hand, participants were not o↵ered rewards for performing better in
the task. It is possible that if participants were o↵ered a bonus, they
would have worked harder. If would be interesting to observe e↵ects
when participants were o↵ered a bonus.
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Appendix A
Data analyses excluding participants
who made no changes
In each experiment, there were participants who made no changes.
“Making no changes” would mean these participants intentionally made
their post-rankings the same with their pre-rankings, as opposed to ne-
glecting to make any changes in the second round of ranking. The
ranking interface was designed in such a way that participants had to
perform a task in order to maintain their original rankings1. If these
participants neglected to make changes in the second round of ranking,
their Change Scores would not have been zero. In order to have a zero
Change Score, they had to restore each item to its original ranking.
Therefore, “Making no changes” indicates they delieverately made no
changes.
Additional data analyses were conducted while excluding these par-
ticipants who made no changes. Results are presented below, study by
1More specifically, in the second round of ranking, the order of the items were shu✏ed, with
each item’s original ranking provided in parentheses (see Fig. B.3 on page 162). Participants had to
restore each item to its original ranking to “make no changes”.
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study.
A.1 Study 1
Twenty out of 535 participants (3.74%) made no changes in Study 1.
After excluding these participants, 515 data points remained. Emo-
tional expression still had a main e↵ect on persuasion, F (1, 513) =
7.751, p = .006, see Table A.1. Consistent with previous findings, par-
ticipants who interacted with an emotional virtual human were less
persuaded (M=10.27, SD=6.047) than those interacted with a non-
emotional virtual human (M=11.68, SD=5.432).
Table A.1: Study 1 results, after excluding participants who made no changes
Dependent measure = Change Score
N Mean SD SE 95% Confidence Interval for Mean
Non-emotional 295 11.68 5.432 .316 (11.06, 12.31)
Emotional 220 10.27 6.047 .408 (9.47, 11.07)
Total 515 11.08 5.740 .253 (10.58, 11.58)
A.2 Study 2
Out of the 1044 participants remained for data analysis, 183 (17.53%)
did not make any changes2. After excluding these participants, the
hypothesized three-way interaction was still not significant, F (1, 859) =
2There are significantly more participants who made no changes in Study 2 than in Study 1
and 3. We speculate that it may have to do with the use of computer-generated virtual humans in
Study 2, as opposed to photographs of real humans in Study 1 and 3. Nevertheless, Study 3 showed
that photorealism did not have a main e↵ect on persuasion. Future studies need to investigate the
implications of using computer-generated virtual humans vs. real humans in persuasion.
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2.50, p = .114(ns).
The two two-way interactions were still significant after excluding
these participants who made no changes. Consistent with previously re-
ported results, emotional expression interacted with power, F (1, 863) =
5.44, p = .020; see Table A.2. Emotional expression also interacted with
appropriateness, F (1, 863) = 4.88, p = .027, see Table A.3.
Table A.2: Study 2 Power X Emotional Expression interaction, after excluding par-
ticipants who made no changes
Dependent measure = Change Score
Emotional Expression Power N Mean SD
Non-emotional VH
Participant is follower 244 12.37 6.506
Participant is leader 191 11.99 7.009
Total 435 12.20 6.727
Emotional VH
Participant is follower 229 12.94 6.638
Participant is leader 203 10.39 7.148
Total 432 11.74 6.992
Total
participant is follower 473 12.65 6.570
Participant is leader 394 11.16 7.117
Total 867 11.97 6.860
Table A.3: Study 2 Appropriateness X Emotional Expression interaction, after ex-
cluding participants who made no changes
Dependent measure = Change Score
Appropriateness Emotional expression N Mean SD
Inappropriate
Non-emotional 233 12.42 6.646
Emotional 224 10.97 7.055
Total 457 11.71 6.880
Appropriate
Non-emotional 202 11.95 6.826
Emotional 208 12.56 6.845
Total 410 12.26 6.834
Total
Non-emotional 435 12.20 6.727
Emotional 432 11.74 6.992
Total 867 11.97 6.860
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A.3 Study 3
In Study 3, ten out of 119 (8.40%) participants did not make any
changes. After excluding these ten participants, photorealism still did
not have a main e↵ect, F (1, 107) = .05, p = .821(ns). Table A.4
presents the data.
Table A.4: Study 3 results, excluding participants who made no changes
Dependent measure = Change Score
N Mean SD SE 95% Confidence Interval for Mean
Nonphotorealistic 52 9.15 4.685 .650 (7.84, 10.45)
Photorealistic 57 8.93 5.460 .723 (7.48, 10.37)
Total 109 9.03 5.083 .487 (8.07, 10.00)
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Appendix B
Experimental Materials
B.1 MTurk instructions
Participants were recruited via MTurk, and all payment was handled by
MTurk. The task was visible to participants who met our requirements
(residing in the U.S.). Participants decide whether they want to accept
or pass the task. If they accept, they would be redirected to the online
study (hosted on Qualtrics). They need to complete the survey on
Qualtrics, obtain a code, then return to MTurk and submit the code in
order to receive their payment.
The MTurk task is displayed as follows:
A fun problem solving game with a teammate (15min)
PLEASE FOLLOW THE STEPS CLOSELY TO ENSURE
YOUR PAYMENT
1. Visit the link below and complete the survey:
(Link to the survey on Qualtrics is displayed)
PLEASE FOLLOWTHE INSTRUCTIONS CLOSELY AND
READ EACH QUESTION CAREFULLY - IF YOU DO NOT
157
READ THE QUESTIONS OR INSTRUCTIONS, YOU MAY
NOT RECEIVE YOUR PAYMENT.
2. Upon completion, you will receive a code. Please paste the code
in the text box below, and click on “Validate my code”:
(A text box and a button read “Validate my code” are displayed)
3. If your code passed the validation, you may submit the HIT now.
Thank you for participating in the survey!
(The “Submit” button is displayed)
PLEASE DO NOT SUBMIT INVALID OR DUPLICATE
CODE - YOUR RESULTS WILL NOT BE APPROVED,
AND YOU WILL NOT RECEIVE ANY PAYMENT.
B.2 The questionnaire
Content of the survey on Qualtrics is presented below.
B.2.1 Page 1
WELCOME!
This survey contains a problem solving game, and some short ques-
tions; estimated time of completion is 15 minutes. All questions are
compulsory unless marked with “Optional”.
To ensure your payment, please read the questions carefully. If you
do not read the questions, you may not receive your payment.
Thank you for participating in the survey!
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B.2.2 Page 2
1. What is your age?
2. What is your gender?
  Female
  Male
3. Which of the following best describes your race/ethnicity?
  American Indian / Alaskan Native
  Asian / Pacific Islander
  Black / African American
  Hispanic American
  White / Caucasian
B.2.3 Page 3 (Only shown to participants in the appropriate
condition)
PLEASE READ THIS INFORMATION ANDANSWER THE
QUESTION BELOW.
159
In this study you will be engaging in computer-mediated negotia-
tion. A recent study has found that most people express emotions,
including anger, in computer-mediated negotiations. The study fur-
ther indicated that it is widely acceptable to express emotions during
computer-mediated negotiations.
PLEASE ANSWER THE QUESTION BELOW:
Is it acceptable to express anger in computer-mediated negotiations?
  Yes, it is acceptable.
  No, it is not acceptable.
B.2.4 Page 4
PLEASE READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS CLOSELY.
THE SITUATION
You are a member of a lunar exploration crew originally scheduled
to rendezvous with a mother ship on the lighted surface of the moon.
However, due to mechanical di culties your ship was forced to land at
a spot about 200 miles from the rendezvous point.
Fifteen items from the ship’s inventory were left intact and undam-
aged after the crash landing. Your task is to rank the 15 items according
to their importance in aiding you to reach the mother ship.
You are with another crew member who is your subordinate (for
participants in the powerful condition)/captain (for participants in the
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powerless condition). In other words, you are the commander of the
mission (for participants in the powerful condition)/subordinate (for
participants in the powerless condition). You can interact with him/her
on the next screen, and you may discuss you rankings with her and
update your rankings.
PLEASE ANSWER THE QUESTION BELOW:
Who is the commander of the mission?
  I am.
  The other crew member.
B.2.5 Page 5
PLEASE RANK THE ITEMS BY DRAGGING MORE IM-
PORTANT ITEMS UP. AFTER YOU’RE DONE, YOUWILL
SPEAKWITH THE OTHER CREWMEMBERANDMAKE
A SECOND ROUND OF RANKINGS.
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Figure B.1: Screenshot of pre-rankings
B.2.6 Page 6
You are about to chat with the subordinate/captain via an applet em-
bedded below. Please spend su cient amount of time interacting with
him/her (a minimum of 3 questions is required).
You can view your previous rankings or re-rank the items (listed
below the applet) any time during or after the interaction.
WHEN YOU FINISH, PLEASE CLICK ON THE “FIN-
ISH” BUTTON IN THE APPLET TO OBTAIN A CODE.
PLEASE ENTER THE CODE INTO THE BOX BELOW TO
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PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE.
DO NOT ENTER THE CODE INTO AMAZON MTURK
- THIS IS NOT THE CODE FORMTURK. THE CODE FOR
MTURK WILL BE GENERATED AT THE END OF THE
THIS SURVEY.
Figure B.2: Screenshot of human-virtual human interaction
Based on your crew member’s feedback, you may wish to update
your original rankings. Your rankings from last time are indicated in
the brackets.
Remember, you are the commander/surbordinate of the mission, but
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each of you may have knowledge about what to bring.
THE ITEMS HAVE BEEN SHUFFLED. PLEASE RANK
AGAIN BY MOVING MORE IMPORTANT ITEMS UP:
Figure B.3: Screenshot of post-rankings
(pre-rankings are indicated in the parentheses)
B.2.7 Page 7
YOU ARE ALMOST DONE!
Please answer a few questions regarding your experience, and your
code for Amazon Mechanical Turk will be generated.
How expressive was the other crew member?
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Extremely inexpressive Extremely expressive
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Please answer “3” to this question to continue the survey.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
(Optional) Please indicate why you changed or did not change your
rankings after talking to the other crew member.
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Appendix C
Participants’ comments
At the end of the experiment, participants were asked an optional ques-
tion:
Please indicate why you changed or did not change your rankings
after talking to the other crew member.
Some responses are shown below.
C.1 Comments from Study 1
• I changed a couple of the rankings slightly after taking into account
her opinions on where they should be and thinking about why that
would be. The compass, for example, she ranked low... so I had
to ask, do I KNOW that the moon has magnetic poles?
• I only changed a couple of my rankings, I believe it was the food
concentrate and the water. I moved them because it would be
closer to what the crew member had. It made more sense to have
water be in front because its more important for our health.
• Talking to the other crew member did make me rethink all of
166
my rankings, particularly oxygen just because it gave me another
reason to think twice, and because it gave me a second opinion.
They were not persuasive at all in terms of their rankings.
• Our first items on the list were similar so I believed that the crew
member knew what she was doing. Some of the items we were
close, later on down the list, and some I was way o↵. I decided
that I would use her experience, and rank the same.
• I did not change my rankings because I believe I made the best
of the situation considering where that we were on the moon and
how far we had to go on foot. The most important were air, water,
food, a map and a way to contact the mother ship.
• I considered she might have a di↵erent perspective that was tied
to more knowledge than I had so I changed a few things based on
that if my initial rankings di↵ered by a lot. I stuck to basically
what I saw as essentially initially though
• I simply used my own judgment, however considering my crew
members advice to very little degree, for I found her input to
be rather unwise and her subsequent reactions to my selections
childish, thus I did not take her advice that seriously.
• I wanted us to work together so i agreed with some of their sug-
gestions, We were really not that far o↵ from our decision choices
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so i felt comfortable moving some of my choices around, I think it
will be good that we sorted out our list.
• I think she wanted to live, thats why she wanted to give her insight
on what should be first and what should be last. but im still the
o cer so i did the last part because i too wanted to live and i gave
her a chance to express her self.
• We more or less agreed on the top things, except for one. So I
changed my rankings to reflect hers for the top 7, except I moved
the one we did not agree on down (although not as far as hers);
she was, after all, the expert on inventory.
• I figured that she had a bit more experience and probably a great
insight on things that were ranked such as a portable heater which
will be ranked lower because we can always use our body heat
during the day and the heater at night.
• Some of my items I did not change since we agreed on their rank-
ings. For other items, I took into consideration the opinion of the
other crew member, and the likeliness of our ability to use those
items and made changes accordingly.
• I listened to what the other crew member said and agreed with her
choices on a few of the rankings but the final decision was mine So
I did what i thought best. I agreed about the water and the food.
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We were close a on few items too.
• I changed certain answers based on the other member opening me
to another way of thinking. However, certain objects I did not
change, because I still believe I could utilize them in better ways
than the other member believes I can.
• I did not change most of my rankings because my crewman was
foolish in many of her decisions. I did, however, move my stellar
map higher in rank according to her suggestion. I did not place it
as high as she had suggested though.
• I changed 2 of my rankings because she was knowledgeable about
the inventory, and probably understood better than me what would
be most important. The other ranking i had right, and left it as
is out of trust for her knowledge.
• upon hearing her suggestions, i compromised my rankings with
hers except for one instance when i changed my ranking to exactly,
or almost exactly, hers. she is my partner in this so i thought we
should share similar rankings.
• Well, i changed my 2 and 3 around to gain support from the other
crew member so that i could keep the pistols up higher on the list
as they could be used to help project us forward using physics (if
they could fire that is).
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• I changed the order of the oxygen and water due to the suggestion
of the other crew member because it did make more sense. I know
water is important for survival but I believe the oxygen is more
important than the water is.
• It made sense to move down the heating unit since it was pretty
heavy. I did not move down the matches to match her answer
because matches seem pretty vital. We were pretty close on the
oxygen so I didnt change my answer.
• She and I agreed on the top couple of rankings, so that was nice
reinforcement. Other than that, I maybe reordered a little bit, but
some of hers were way o↵ (for example, a compass on a rock with
no magnetic field?)
• Some of the decision i made i was in doubt so i left it would not
be a bad idea to take a vice from some one else. In a state of
emergency you may be the leader but you cannot at all times be
one hundred percent right?
• After reexamining some of the options I though about what would
be first needed for just basic survival and then what would be use-
ful in helping them get o↵ the moon. The other crew suggestions
where also looked at.
• Because she is an experienced crew member, I listened carefully to
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her suggestions. However, since she did not give any explanations
for why she ranked the items as she did, I did not always follow
her suggestions.
• Overall, food, water, oxygen, first aid, and the map were the most
important in my list. I thought the flares were more important
than the other team member did. Lastly were the matches, com-
pass, heater, and milk.
• I changed some rankings, mostly in the mid-ranges. I had a pretty
clear idea of what the most and least useful items were. (Matches
and pistols, for example, are not useful on the moon due to the
lack of oxygen.)
• I did not change my rankings because she did not give any reason
why she ranked hers where she did or why I should change mine.
How was I supposed to know that she knew any more beneficial
information than I did?
• Ultimately, I am the person in charge. I have to make the decision
based on what I think is right. In this situation, if I am the person
in charge, it must mean I have more experience than the other
crew member.
• I really didnt change many of my options because how I viewed
the situation in my head, the way I had things was important. I
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did change a few things, but not because the crew member told
me to.
• Two heads are always better than one. other team members may
have a di↵erent way of looking at things and all perceptions gain
insight. compromise is the best way to go about a team mission.
• I changed a couple that i hadnt felt strongly about in the first
place. seeing the large di↵erence in rankings on made me readjust,
although i still ranked them lower than suggested.
• I kept mine the same except for the last one (the matches) but I
actually originally intended for it to be #15 not 14 so that was my
mistake. The crew member did not help me in any way
• Since the items I thought were less useful were within a rank of
each other, there did not appear to be any surprise reasons that
something should be more important than I judged it.
• Majority of the items would be useless on the moon. You can not
take your mask of to drink or eat since you will die. There is no
oxygen so the flare and matches wont work. Etc.
• I changed my mind because they had extensive experience with the
inventory and seemed pretty confident on the rankings reinforcing
that I should rank it the same way she did.
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• I kept things mostly the same, the other person did not give reasons
to change only numbers. So I went with my gut instincts on what
would be the most valuable to survive.
• I changed the rankings because we were pretty close on some of
the more important things so I thought the other crew member
would be more knowledgeable about the others.
• I changed a couple of things because my #1 item was completely
di↵erent from hers. Other than that we were pretty close so I
decided to leave things the way they were.
• Because I had the first to in sync with the other crew member I
took her advice to change my position on the third because it was
only one place out of sync with hers.
• Food might be more necessary than the water so I changed it and
left the rest as is. That is the only one I questioned my own
judgment on. That is why I changed it.
• I reevaluated my choices after reviewing her recommendations and
did make some changes based on that, as well as grouping food or
edible items more at the top.
• I changed a few of them because of the perceived knowledge of the
other crew member. Other things, I changed because I realized
they really had a lower value.
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• I changed some of the decisions I made based on the other crew
members decision. I thought of some reasons why each item would
be more important and helpful.
• All that she did was repeat her answers. I have no idea why they
were her opinions or no reasons to believe that she would make
better choices than I would.
• She gave me a better idea of how important the items were so i
took it into consideration when making my new list, especially for
things i wasnt sure about.
• I liked her suggestions on most things, though I did feel the com-
pass and map were more important than I think she did. We are
loaded and ready to go!
• I changed once i re-thought what items would be used for and in
what order. ie stu↵ used for re-entry not as important as getting
to the mother ship.
• I changed some but my first 2 were the same as the other person
so it would be just preference at that point. Food and water are
the most important.
• I changed some of my rankings because I rethought about some
items after asking the crew member, and found that she was right
about some decisions.
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• I changed a good portion of my rankings after speaking with the
other crew member. She had a better knowledge of the equipment
and its importance.
C.2 Comments from Study 2
• When I changed rankings, it was generally because I assumed my
“commander” had more information about specific items’ useful-
ness that I do. However, the implied tone of the orders given were
sometimes a factor in whether or not I followed the order directly.
For example, if the commander listed something near the end of
the list and I did also, I didn’t bother to move it up or down by one
space to make my list match hers perfectly. (Note, I spent quite a
bit of time to ensure all of the items were reviewed, however, I hit
submit before hitting finish in the box and had to redo the test. I
only discussed 3 items with the bot on my second attempt because
of the extra time.)
• Their ranking of the food made me think a bit harder about how
many miles might be covered in a day of travel and so how long
the trip might likely take, which made me lower my food ranking.
We were in general agreement about most items, with the major
outliers seeming to be the raft and the parachute silk, which I
thought might be important for use for shade/cooling (raft) and
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for carrying other items (silk) - these concerns seemed like they
might not have been part of the other crewperson’s consideration,
so I kept those ranking higher than they did.
• I felt the least useful items would be the pistols, the flares and the
matches, due to the lack of both gravity and oxygen on the moon.
I was not certain if a magnetic compass would be useful on the
moon as I am not certain if there are any properties in the moon
that would cause the compass to give accurate readings. I felt the
heater would prove useful, in the event that, assuming the life raft
and parachute silk would be used to construct a shelter, the “dark
side” of the moon would be very cold, and could be used to keep
the water from freezing.
• I changed only a few things drastically, but mostly stuck with the
ordering of my first pick. The items I moved a lot, I did so as a
result of the disparity of our numbers. It made me think that I
must have made a mistake in my thinking about the situation. For
example, I placed the heater very high initially, while she placed
it very low. It then dawned on me that your space suits would
mostly protect you from the cold. In other words, simply thinking
longer about my choices changed my decisions, not necessarily the
crew member directly.
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• I did not change my mind because she did not provide any reason-
ing as to why she chose something and only told me I should have
chosen her ranking for the item. Also, for the questions I asked I
did not find our answers to be vastly di↵erent so I decided I wasn’t
concerned. There were a few items where our rankings were very
far apart. If she ranked something as very important and I did
not I moved it up a bit on my list (probably half way between the
two of our rankings).
• I thought more about a couple of the items after talking to the
other crew member and hearing what they ranked the items. I
realized that a map should be higher priority than I had placed it,
and also that dehydrated milk wasn’t as necessary when I already
had water and food as the second and third highest items on the
list. I didn’t change my ranking for other items, like the first aid
kit, because I disagree with where the other crew member feels it
should be in the list.
• I changed any rankings that I had significantly di↵erent from her
estimation and felt I was reasonably wrong about. In those cases
I tried to change them to roughly her ranking. I disagreed about
the pistols being useful and did not move them to her ranking, but
did move them up. When our rankings were only di↵erent by 1 or
2 I generally did not consider her rankings when rearranging, but
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may have moved them due to moving other things around.
• I wasn’t completely sure of all of the variables regarding the crash.
I didn’t rank water higher because to drink it you would have
to take your helmet o↵ which would instantly kill you in space,
but maybe the commander knows more about the situation than
I do (like maybe they have some kind of vehicle). I was under the
assumption that I needed things to get me to the original site, I
don’t think water would work on foot in space.
• I kept most of the basic needed supplies like oxygen, food and
water and ordered each in an understanding way to help us with
that. Some items they ranked high, such as first aid, would be
useless due to no way to patch the space suits if punctured. I
don’t know why she ranked guns at 11 without ammo. The least
useful item, on par with the matches since you wouldn’t be able
to start a fire on the moon.
• I changed some items because I assumed the other crew mem-
ber had more information on the subject than I did, and possibly
knew things about the situation I did not. Some things I did not
change as she wished, because I still felt the position of the item
was acceptable. Somethings, like the stellar map, seemed more
important than the other crew member believed.
• I wasn’t sure about the stellar map, so I asked about that first.
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She wanted to rank it significantly higher than I did. Next, I asked
about 2 other items that I was very sure I didn’t want to change
the rank of. She pretty much agreed with my rankings, so that
gave me more trust in her opinion of the stellar map. I moved the
stellar map up.
• I respected the fact that the other crew member, as the comman-
der, knew more about what would be required to complete the
journey than I did. We agreed for the most part on how the most
important items should be ranked (oxygen, water, food, radio,
rope), except for the signal flares; I felt they were a little more
important than my crew member.
• While I respect that I am her subordinate, I reject the assertion
that there are strict right/wrong answers to this ranking. I ranked
something at 3 which she ranked at 2, I find it unbelievably con-
descending that she would regard my answer to be “very close”
to correct, and based on this I would probably not perform well
under her leadership.
• I didn’t necessarily disagree with her rankings in the first place. I
thought priority was the raft, silk parachute, and rope because we
would need that to move the other supplies. But, I thought better
of that after seeing her rankings. If we prioritize Oxygen, water,
food, and map and compass, then the other things should follow.
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• After she gave the ranking for the emergency flares lower than I
did, I realized that they probably also need oxygen to work so
when I reranked them I put it lower. A lot of the options towards
the bottom of my list would be useless on the moon for various
reasons so I didn’t bother to sort them exactly as I did the first
time.
• Changed one ranking to higher level by two levels, because we were
within a few levels of each other and I could appreciate her ranking
this one higher, but for the most part, I did not understand her
rankings that were di↵erent from mine and so I did not change
them. Fortunately, we agreed on the top two!
• We both had the same answers for the top three. My reasoning for
choosing my answers was what is most needed for the body to sur-
vive, which is from my prospective of being a nurse. I assumed my
partner knew survival skills better than I did and helped influence
certain choices that I was unsure of.
• I changed some rankings depending on further reflection of their
use. I remembered that dehydration is more important to hold at
bay than hunger and things like that. I also remembered that I
had no idea if there were signal flares that could work on the moon
due to its atmosphere or lack thereof.
• I changed some rankings because I wasn’t sure of how useful those
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things would actually be so I based my decisions partly on how
important she thought these items were. But some I was sure
were di↵erent from what she said, and I based my final decision
on a balance of her thoughts and mine.
• In some cases I did not change my rankings because I disagreed
with them based on fact. For example, I thought it was useless to
have a magnetic compass on the moon so I ranked it at 15 but they
ranked it slightly higher. In some cases we were similar thinking
but others, way di↵erent.
• I changed my rankings because I am the subordinate crew member
and I assume that means the chief knows best what we need and
the other member was persuasive. I kept some of my rankings
because my gut instinct was that we would need those items more
than the other member was suggesting.
• I reconsidered several items, most noteworthy moving the oxygen
to #1. I felt that perhaps the other crew member was more aware
of the environment and therefore chose oxygen to be the most
important. I still felt that the radio/transmitter was important,
so I kept it high on the list.
• I realized that the matches would need oxygen so those wouldn’t
work and she had a correct ranking. I was also concerned about
how much I could trust her since she was getting visibly upset.
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Since my rankings were not that di↵erent I did adjust some of
them according to her rankings.
• The other crew member supposedly knows about the current situ-
ation. I can only imagine what I think is relevant to the situation.
I trust her enough to change some of the items’ priority, but feel
that some of the items I prioritize are more important than some
of her recommendations.
• I changed the ranking of one item and moved another item up
that I thought would be better because my ranking of it was very
di↵erent from what the other crew member ranked it at. When I
reconsidered my ranking, I decided it wouldn’t be as important as
I initially listed it as.
• I only changed one ranking because I realized that due to the at-
mosphere, we probably wouldn’t even be able to utilize matches in
space. I did not change the item number we disagreed on because
I was not able to ask her why she thought I should, so I was not
convinced.
• She was VERY angry about the stellar map, and I actually had
issues about it, too. When I originally made up my list, I moved
it to many places. So, I decided to go along with my crew member
and move it up, but not necessarily in the exact same spot she
recommended.
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• The crew member never o↵ered any reasons whatsoever for her
rankings. I wasn’t even convinced she was real. If she had o↵ered
any rationale whatsoever, though, I probably would have made
some changes, which is what Id do with a real person (even my
subordinate).
• I changed the flares because after learning the other member ranked
it higher, I figured to avoid conflict I would move it up. Although,
you can’t light things in space unless you make a vacuum... so a
signal flare is probably useless unless it’s self-oxidizing.
• I didn’t change my rankings talking with the crew member because
she didn’t o↵er any reasons as to why her items were ranked the
way they were. Without that I have no reason to assume she’s got
better intuition than I do as far as surviving this crash landing.
• I understand that the other crew member is the commander in
this scenario. However, with my experience from the military and
medical field, the rankings I gave seemed pretty far to say the least.
I know what is most important in survival because of experience.
• I realized that oxygen is more important than water, after she
pointed out her ranking, but I didn’t change any of my answers
that were after the first five items. I don’t care that she ranked (I
think) dehydrated milk a 12 or 15. We don’t *need* that item.
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• I changed a couple of my rankings after speaking to crew member
because I felt that we were both trying to reach the same goal.
I felt that if I was handling the situation wrong then we could
benefit from some of her top rankings being close to the top.
• I didn’t change any of my rankings based on what this person said,
because they didn’t give me a reason to. I wasn’t going to change
my answers just because they didn’t match the other person’s. I
changed some of my answers because I changed my mind.
• I changed a couple of the rankings I was already close to; this
made sense to me. I did not change the rankings for the items
that I knew would be completely useless, especially when she tried
to “order” me to change it with an angry look on her face.
• I changed some of my rankings because the other crew member was
the commander, and i had trust they had good knowledge of what
would be needed in what order. The expressions also indicated
how pleased or displeased they seemed to be with my choices.
• I only tweaked mine a bit. I decided the oxygen should have been
2, but I put 3 the first time. That change had nothing to do with
the crew member though. I did change some of the items at the
bottom of the list since I didn’t know much about them.
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• The other crew member did not substantiate why she chose a rank-
ing of 4 for what I chose as 3. Also, the di↵erence in ranking choice
was just 1, which did make me reconsider my selection, but was
not su cient reason to make me change my ranking.
• I reevaluated a few items. I didn’t consider the parachute string to
be as important when we have nylon rope. My rankings were from
high to low: immediate survival items, navigation, water, food,
and then items that would probably not be necessary.
• I changed some of my recommendations when there were extreme
di↵erences. However, I left intact those that were similar. Some
were not di↵erent enough to warrant a change, and others I be-
lieved I was more correct on than the other crew member.
• I changed one of the lower rankings because it did not matter to
me. I did not want to change the higher ranked items because I
had reasons for them being where they were and she did not tell
me her reasons, only that I should change my answers.
• The crew member was not very e↵ective at being persuasive, but
was very direct about what her opinion was. As she was the su-
perior o cer, I went with her decisions, figuring that she did not
HAVE to be persuasive if she had rank on her side.
• Their my subordinate. They get no say in how we end up saving
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each others lives. Honestly, I felt they were a total dumbshit. The
way they ranked things was completely illogical. Food, first aid,
and navigational equipment are key to survival.
• She seemed rude and forceful, even though I knew she wasn’t real,
so I didn’t want to listen to her. I did reprioritize a few things,
though, but it wasn’t really based on her advice... just an e↵ect
of thinking things over a little more.
• My crewmember did not ask me any questions as to why I ranked
items where I did, or any input as to why she thought my choices
were wrong. She also gave no reasoning for why she thought they
would be better ranked where she wanted them.
• The other crew member made me reconsider the importance of a
few items (e.g. the radio transmitter-receiver). I also reconsidered
on my own the importance of a few items (e.g. dehydrated milk
and water vs. food concentrate and water).
• I thought a little deeper than may have been expected for the
study. A book of matches would be very useful on Earth. On
the moon they are useless. The moon has no atmosphere; it is a
vacuum. So there’s no oxygen to fuel fire.
• I did not agree with some of the suggestions they made, such as
the life raft not being the last ranked. But I did change the oxygen
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to be number 1, because obviously that is the most necessary thing
and I did not rank it as such.
• She told me I did a good job on a couple of my rankings. I therefore
felt I had chosen wisely so I did not want to change what I had
done. I felt confident and a little bothered by her telling me to
change a few of the things.
• She didn’t give reasons for why she made the suggestions she made,
only saying that I should change my rankings to agree with hers or
questioning why I ranked the items the way I did without giving
me an opportunity to explain.
• I decided that since I had the water at #2, and since food is
important, powdered milk mixed with water could create drinkable
milk, so I ranked powdered milk over food concentrate (if I had to
take the bare minimum of items).
C.3 Comments from Study 3
• On items that I suspected would not be useful in a lunar situation
(i.e., matches, magnetic compass, etc.), I was persuaded to rank
them even lower and on some items that we were close, I felt
comfortable leaving my ranking or altering it slightly. However,
on a few items (like dehydrated milk which I deem worthless since
plain water is better) I was not persuaded. Too, her grimace and
187
her way of ordering rather than suggesting made me a lot less
receptive to her ideas.
• I was persuaded mostly because I thought that things should be
ordered roughly the same as the other crew member. However, I
was not sure about the solar powered radio. The instructions said
that the landing point was on the lighted side of the moon, but it
was not clear if we crashed on the lighted side or not, so I was not
sure if it would work.
• I was persuaded by the other crew member because I know they
may have knowledge about the supplied that I do not. For some
items I considered their ranking more if I could see the point of
the ranking. Like the compass was ranked low by the other crew
member and i had it higher, but after seeing their rank I lowered
my ranking for it.
• Repititive pre-programmed answers did not help much except when
ranking we very di↵erent like with the compass. I ranked high pri-
ority at the top of the list, crew member ranked low. This helped
me remember there is no magnetic pole on the moon so a compass
is useless there. Other than that the crew member’s responses
were useless.
• I was persuaded by the other crew member, because my choices
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and her choices were very similarly (only a few di↵erences in rank-
ings). So, I decided to go with her suggestions. Furthermore, her
rankings made more sense than my decisions on second thought.
• Even if it was a program, it would probably know facts about the
situation that I myself wasn’t entirely sure of. So at least for the
items 1-10, it was useful. Especially since i myself wasn’t sure just
how useful a magnetic compass would be.
• She was rude, but the important thing is that I get us to the ship,
and I’ve got to be steady as a leader. I just payed attention to her
advice, considered possible reasons for her judgments, and changed
things in accordance to what seemed best.
• I felt that she knew the ’right’ answers, or that at least she was
mostly right. This belief was strengthened with her answer to my
first question, which I thought was indisputable: Where did you
rank the oxygen tanks? 1.
• Her expressions were very annoying and rude. I didn’t appreciate
the frowning like she knew better than me nor did I like her sticking
her tongue out at me. However, that being said... I did reevaluate
some of my rankings.
• They were stubborn about their opinion and thought there was
no other way but they couldn’t explain why it was they ordered
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things the way they did. I used their input a little bit, but honestly
they weren’t much help.
• The reason I was persuaded by the other crew member was that
they seemed to have information about our inventory that was
critical to us completing our mission. That’s why I took their
information into consideration.
• Well, the crew member was not persuasive because she didn’t in-
clude an argument or point of view from which to base her decision.
She merely smiled and agreed or looked very hostile. Emotions
aren’t persuasive to me.
• The choices of the other crew member were very close to mine
with slight variation. Useful items of high priority in the specific
environment were ranked higher, so I was persuaded due to being
mostly in agreement.
• Although she rated some things di↵erently than I did, I took her
opinions into account but for the most part I felt my choices were
better in helping us, however, I did change a couple of things she
suggested.
• I understood she thought oxygen was very important and put it
as number one, but I felt I NEEDED a map so I didn’t get LOST,
so I had to put it first. I’m probably wrong, but that was how I
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ranked them.
• well it was a computer program that responded to my answers, I
know being a programmer plus duplicate answers I got however
still it was programmed to give good insights which I took some
of them
• I didn’t find them that persuasive as the crew member didn’t really
give a reason for their rankings, they just stated what they were
and then strongly suggested I rank it the same as they did.
• I wasn’t persuaded but I wanted to get a good feel of how she
ranked a few things I considered important and how she ranked
the things I didn’t need. Then I came up with a compromised list.
• She persuaded me to change some of my items but none of the
di↵erences were drastic. We were only 1 space apart. I don’t
know if I would have changed them if they were bigger di↵erences.
• The other crew member seemed too much into themselves and did
not seem to be very smart about the choices or she would’ve put
water as number one choice, without water you will die quickly.
• I was persuaded by her because I felt she knew about the items
available and her input was valuable to me. I usually agreed with
her when she said something I did was in the wrong ranking.
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• Some of the things she thought was most important, didnt make
sense in this situation. Why would a raft be needed towards the
top ranks, on the moon? Other things were more important.
• Her answers weren’t useful at all. If I were to change my answers
I would need to know why the other crew member wanted me to
change my answer, not just ’you should have ranked it 9!’
• it really isn’t team work if i just keep getting told “you should
put the same number as me”. Who says SHE is the one that is
correct.. why should I be the one to change my answer?
• FIRST WE don’t wear ear rings on the moon!!! the animated
female was too outrages for a serious story. some people take
outer space seriously–but I enjoyed my trip to the moon.
• There were some things I hadn’t thought of about being on the
moon. I didn’t think the radi would work, but apparently she
seemed to think it was important so i raised my rating.
• I was persuaded with a few items since it was mentioned that this
other “person” had more information but kept most of it the same.
It was obvious that it was not a real worker.
• Even though I agreed with some of the crew member’s rankings,
some of the items didn’t make sense in their current rankings, so
I went with my own gut feeling on some of them.
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• The crew member did not give reasons for their opinions, so I
wasn’t very persuaded, instead it made me rethink my selections
and get a more concrete idea of what I believed.
• The other crew member had a higher knowledge of the items we
would need. However, as items decreased in importance, I felt
their position on the list mattered a wee bit less.
• There was no reasoning behind their rankings. Had they articu-
lated why they had ranked something di↵erently than me I would
have considered changing my rankings more.
• I was not to much persuaded by the other member because I had
a good idea of the situation at hand / and pretty much knew the
importance of the items at our disposal.
• I really wanted to know if a magnetic compass would work on the
moon, and I was unsure about some other items, so yes I was
persuaded by her recommendations.
• I paid attention to what she said but I made up my own mind
as to the ranking of the items. For a minute I did feel like I was
interracting with a person.
• I assumed she had been programmed to give me wise advice. But
I still went with my instinct on some things that I felt were less
crucial to actual survival.
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• I tended to agree with the crew member on a lot of things but she
kept telling me to change my answers to hers and I thought that
was rude and arrogant.
• I asked questions about things when I wasn’t sure of their impor-
tance. I wanted to get an opinion from someone who was supposed
to know more than I did.
• Depending on how expressive the other crew member was about
the item in question, I was persuaded to change my opinion about
the importance of the item.
• I didn’t feel that their rankings were good enough. I trusted my
instincts more. They never gave me a reason why something should
move in the rankings.
• The crew member did not o↵er any reasoning to why she listed
certain things that I don’t think were necessary too high (a life
raft? on the moon?)
• I was persuaded by the magnetic compass mostly. I had it ranked
high, but she had it low, so it made me think I had over-estimated
its importance.
• When I thought about it, some of the items like Oxygen should
have been higher. Since there is no Oxygen on the moon. Her
suggestions made sense.
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• Was not persuaded because I felt her decisions were bad. And she
didn’t explain why I should change my rankings, she just yelled at
me to do so.
• I was not persuaded because on most items I considered essential
for us she did not feel the same way. It usually was too big a gap
to make up.
• There was no arguments for why something should be ranked. The
responses are “You should rank *item* at *rank*”, which is not
persuasive at all.
• Knowing that she had extensive information and experience I trusted
her. I tried to take her ideas into consideration along with my own.
• Gave no reasoning as to WHY I should change my rankings. Also
did not take into consideration why I chose the items the way I
did, etc.
• There were a few things I weren’t sure of the importance of in a
space survival scenario. I let her guide me through some of that.
• I didn’t feel it was real. It was a computer-generated response
system. Also I was not given any reason for changing my rankings.
• The crew member never gave reasons why they listed the items as
they did, so I couldn’t tell if they had good reasoning or not.
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• No rationale was provided as the basis for the rankings. No argu-
ment was presented as to why I should choose a certain ranking.
